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ABSTRACT
Qatar‟s foreign policies and the tools used in achieving them pose various risks and dangers to
the interests of the United States, and its allies. These tools involve the use of the media, terrorist
organizations, hedging, investments, hyperactive diplomacy, and strategic alliances. Through
these tools, Qatar aims to achieve influence and objectives, which are normally beyond the
political circumference of small states. For instance, as a tool of influence, Qatar maintains
relationships with terrorist organizations, which has serious implications for the U.S. fight
against terrorism. However, as an ally, Qatar has advantages for the U.S. through its purchase of
U.S. defense arms and its hosting of U.S. airbases in the region. In this light, Qatar is a
challenging conundrum for the United States. This paper, offers recommendations on how U.S.
policymakers can mitigate against the negative impacts of Qatar‟s foreign policies, while still
maintaining a healthy, and positive relationship with Qatar.

KEYWORDS: Gulf Cooperation Council, Qatar, Asymmetric, Foreign policy, Middle East,
United States of America

iii

ROOTS AND GOALS OF THE STATE OF QATAR’S CONTRADICTORY FOREIGN
POLICY: IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS

By
Osarodion Izevbigie

A Master‟s Thesis
Submitted to the Graduate College
Of Missouri State University
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
Master of Science, Defense and Strategic Studies

December 2019
Approved:
John P. Rose, Ph.D., Brigadier-General U.S. Army (ret) Thesis Committee Chair
Andrei Shoumikhin, Ph.D., Committee Member
Ilan Berman, J.D., Committee Member
Julie Masterson, Ph.D., Dean of the Graduate College

In the interest of academic freedom and the principle of free speech, approval of this thesis
indicates the format is acceptable and meets the academic criteria for the discipline as
determined by the faculty that constitute the thesis committee. The content and views expressed
in this thesis are those of the student-scholar and are not endorsed by Missouri State University,
its Graduate College, or its employees.

iv

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I first of all thank God for His grace and wisdom which saw me throughout my entire
thesis process. I would also like to thank Dr. Rose for his relentless drive to see me succeed in
his capacity both as my professor, and my primary thesis advisor. My gratitude also goes to Dr.
Shoumhikhin, Ilan Berman, J.D, and Ms. Diana Bentele whose valuable inputs were key to the
overall development of my thesis. I would like to thank Ms. Caron Tolton, Ms. Darci Nelson,
Professor Kerry Kartchner, and all other people which made my stay at DSS a wonderful
experience.
I would like to thank Ambassador Robert Joseph for impacting in me the knowledge
needed to succeed in my chosen career and academic path. His willingness to teach based on his
firsthand experiences in dealing with the intricacies of the U.S. government, and strategic
coordination with other nations were of prime importance to me.
Finally, I want to specially thank my parents Pastor and Pastor Mrs. Izevbigie for their
encouragement, love, and prayers. It has been a blessing having them as parents.

v

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction

Page 1

Brief Geopolitical History of Qatar
Significance of Qatar's Geopolitical History on its Strategic
Calculus in its International Relations
Understanding Qatar's Need for Asymmetric Tools

Page 5
Page 13

Qatar‟s Asymmetric Tools in Achieving its Foreign Policies
Strategic Hedging Among Competing Actors
The use of Al Jazeera as a Political tool of Influence and Power
Investment and Branding
Mediation and Hyperactive Diplomacy
Strategic Defense and Security Alliances

Page
Page
Page
Page
Page
Page

21
21
25
35
43
47

The Diverse Interests of the United States in the Middle East
The Political Stability and Security of its Allies
Counter Terrorism and Security
The Stability and Security of Israel

Page
Page
Page
Page

51
51
55
59

Implications of Qatar‟s Asymmetric Tools and Foreign Policy on U.S.
Interests in the Middle East
Qatar's Policy of Strategic Hedging Supports Islamist
Movements that Destabilize the Middle East and U.S. Allies in
the Region
Al Jazeera‟s Message Counters U.S. influence in the Region and
Threatens U.S. Allies in the Middle East
Qatar Using USA Military Presence as a Security Cover to
Undermine the USA and its Allies

Page 62

Understanding the Gulf Cooperation Crisis and the Impact of U.S.
Foreign Policy
Events Leading to the 2017 Gulf Cooperation Crisis
Understanding the Role of America's Foreign-Policy in the GCC
Crisis
Implications of U.S. Foreign Policy Position in the Gulf
Cooperation Crisis

Page 69

Recommendations for USA‟s Foreign Policy Approach towards Qatar
The United States Can Discourage Qatar from Being Complicit
in its Counter Terrorism Efforts by Strategically Employing
Different Instruments of States Power
The USA Can Increase Pressure on Qatar by Seeking an
Alternative Location for its Military Bases

Page 82
Page 82

vi

Page 15

Page 62
Page 64
Page 66

Page 71
Page 73
Page 76

Page 83

The United States Could Diplomatically Engage the GCC to
Strengthen Relations between Member States in Other to Settle
Inter-State Rivalry
The United States Should Encourage Qatar to Return to its Prior
Role as a Mediator of Conflicts in the Region

Page 84
Page 85

Conclusion

Page 87

Bibliography

Page 89

vii

INTRODUCTION

Qatar's rise to prominence in international affairs has stirred up the curiosity of
international relations scholars and observers. This is due to Qatar's internal and geopolitical
realities, which ordinarily are insufficient to facilitate such a rise. Qatar has been able to carve
out a niche for itself, in an international system that has long promoted the cliché of hard power
and superior military capabilities as the basis for influence on the global stage. This rise has
forced a degree of discourse among observers and experts, challenging realist theories on power
in the international system.
Qatar is a small country, with a very small population located in the Middle East
geopolitical zone, where larger and stronger neighbors, such as Saudi Arabia and Iran, surround
it. Historically, Qatar used to be an appendage of Saudi Arabia; however, it has managed to
change its fortunes from a vassal state with no independent foreign policy to a force to be
reckoned with in global affairs.
Not many know of Qatar's prior position within the orbital influence of Saudi Arabia,
given the present clout of Qatar. Qatar's rise is an ideological product, of an overwhelming desire
by its leaders, to place Qatar on the world map. This desire started to bud into fruition as the
younger generation of Qatari leaders began taking over the reins of power. This process started
with the bloodless coup carried out by the former Emir of Qatar, Hamad bin Al Thani, who
overthrew his father Sheikh Khalifa Bin Hamad Al-Thani in 1995. From that time till now, Qatar
has pursued foreign policies that punch far above its weight, with the intent of establishing its
presence regionally and internationally. Qatar implements its foreign policies using unique tools

1

that give very peculiar results, to say the least. Qatar uses these tools strategically to facilitate
and enhance its geopolitical clout.
These tools involve the use of the media through Al Jazeera, fostering political
relationships with terrorist organizations, strategic hedging, investments and branding,
hyperactive diplomacy and mediation, and strategic defense and alliances. These tools give Qatar
an asymmetric ability to shortcut the traditional elements of hard power, which enables Qatar to
maneuver the various hurdles that plague the ability of small states to project influence, and
power in world affairs. For example, through the state-funded Al Jazeera network, Qatar is able
to increase its strategic reach over a substantial population of the Arab world. This gives Qatar an
asymmetric capacity to influence geopolitical events in the Middle East, relative to its size, as
was the case during the period of the Arab spring.
Through Al Jazeera, Qatar was able to play an outsized role during the years of the Arab
spring, dictating the geopolitical direction of that period. The influence of Al Jazeera during the
Arab spring was compelling, given its popularity among Arabs. In fact, Qatar became the face
and voice of the revolution, earning it constant recognition among world leaders. In this light,
Qatar uses these tools to gain recognition, and influence in the international arena, which fits in
with its overall desire, to be a major participant in world affairs regionally and internationally.
The use of these tools, however, comes with peculiar challenges that have long been a
source of tension between Qatar and its allies, especially with the United States. These
challenges are due to the nature of the tools that Qatar employs in carrying out its foreign
policies. A typical example of one such tool is strategic hedging, which can be defined as a
balancing act often used by small states in interacting with larger states with competing interest,
through the simultaneous use of contradictory policies meant to appease all sides. In other words,
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Qatar often uses strategic hedging to “eat its cake and have it.” With this tool, Qatar as an ally of
the U.S. hosts the Al Udeid airbase, which is the largest American military base in the region,
while simultaneously; Qatar also hosts several terrorist leaders and organizations, such as Hamas
and the Taliban.
Qatar also uses the tool of strategic hedging in interacting with its Gulf allies in the Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC), which are also allies of the United States. Qatar does this by
maintaining a relationship with the Gulf Cooperation Council, while it concurrently maintains
ties with entities like Iran and the Muslim Brotherhood, which are adversarial to the interest of
some members of the GCC. In this light, Qatar can be described as the “chameleon of
international relations.” Pundits, international observers, and allies are often perplexed with its
contradictory foreign policies and stance on a range of regional and international issues. These
ambiguities in Qatar‟s foreign policies are because of its attempt to have good relations with
everyone.
With recent happenings placing Qatar in the eye of the storm, it is clear that its policies
are producing results that go against the geopolitical objectives of the United States, which is a
key ally of Qatar and the GCC. The onus has thus fallen on the United States, to provide
leadership and direction, in a region marred with complex challenges. Events such as the
ongoing Gulf Cooperation Council Crisis, shed light into some of the regional concerns of the
United States, as the key actors involved in this crisis are critical drivers of U.S. policies in the
region. The cause of the crisis, though not to oversimplify it as a black and white issue, is heavily
linked to Qatar's contradictory policies.
The United States has had long-standing issues in its relationship with Qatar. For
instance, in many cases, Qatar has gone against U.S. interests, leaving the U.S. vulnerable to the
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aftermath of its actions. Such was the case with Qatar's decision to back extremists in Libya, as
well as Qatar's support for groups deemed as terrorist groups by the United States.1
This paper seeks to analyze Qatar's policies and its effects, both regionally and
internationally, from a U.S. perspective. Ample focus will also be given to understanding Qatar's
motivations for pursuing such maverick policies, as well as its strategic objectives. This paper
will also focus on how the United States can achieve a balance in its relationship with Qatar, and
help the U.S. navigate complex geopolitical hurdles it faces when dealing with Middle Eastern
states.

1

Shapiro, Jeremy. “The Qatar Problem.” Foreign Policy, 28 Aug. 2013, foreignpolicy.com/2013/08/28/the-qatarproblem/
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BRIEF GEOPOLITICAL HISTORY OF QATAR

The paucity of information on Qatar and its history is in no small measure, due to its prior
insignificance as an actor on the global stage. Sparse historical records of activities on the Qatari
peninsula led one Arab author to conclude that prior to the mid-18th century, “its inhabitants led
a peaceful life and confronted no major events thought worthy of historical recording.”2The
irrelevant status of Qatar geo-politically, can be further understood in light of the brevity of space
that was given to it by John Gordon Lorimer, who is regarded as the pioneer historian of Qatar.
Thus, it is no surprise that an aphorism of expatriate lore in the Persian Gulf, states, “Until the
millennium, the state of Qatar was known for being unknown and nothing else.”3
As an actor on the international stage Qatar has long been in the shadows geo-politically,
only interacting within the compass of its stronger neighbors, or its security guarantors, which
has been a major factor of its existence. A timeline down the geopolitical history of Qatar
reveals certain truths about the Sheikdom, and its interactions. Qatar used to be a geo-strategic
playground, for much of its existence in the calculus of its stronger and expansionist neighbors.
Before the consolidation of state power and independence under the house of Al-Thani in 1916,
(the ruling family in Qatar from the Ma'adid clan, which is part of the Banu Tamim Tribal
confederation)4, the peninsula served as a near frontier, a place where conflicts and ambitions of
much more powerful, populated, and influential neighbors could be played out.5

2

Roberts, David B. “The Four Areas of Qatar‟s Foreign Policy.” Comilas Journal for international Relations, no. 5,
2016, pp. 1-17. revistas.upcomillas.es/index.php/internationalrelations/article/download/6740/6544
3
Ibid
4
Syeed Ahmad Haroon. “Anniversary of the National day for the ascension Sheikh Jassim bin Mohammed, the
Founder of the State of Qatar to the Rule of the Country on Dec. 2015.” Diplomatic Forum,
www.diplomaticforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/3-Qatar-Sepecial-Suppliment-2017.pdf
5
Fromherz, Allen J. Qatar: A Modern History. Georgetown University Press, 2017.
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Qatar‟s emergence as an independent state started after the signing of the 1868 agreement
between Qatar and Britain. This British initiated this agreement to stall further clashes between
Bahrain and Qatar, which affected British safe naval passage through the Persian Gulf. Bahrain
had long eyed the territory of Qatar, and asserted its authority over it in such a way that British
lieutenant Macleod observed, Bidaa (the town that will become Doha) is “completely subject to
Bahrain.”6
However, the significance of this treaty was the British recognition of Muhammad AlThani, as the substantive leader of Qatar independent from Bahrain‟s subjugation, since he was
the official representative of Qatar in the signing of the treaty in 1868. The British choice of
Muhammad Al-Thani, marked the beginning of a long royal dynasty of Al-Thani leadership still
ruling Qatar today. Sheikh Muhammad Bin Al-Thani's rise to prominence, despite the presence
of more established and powerful clans, gives a micro picture into Qatar's geopolitical
achievements today.
The Al-Thani clan were basically newcomers relative to the other tribes, and not on a
trajectory that signaled they were destined for Qatari leadership. In fact, in his secret Gazetteer of
the Persian Gulf, J. Lorimer, a well-respected British diplomat, noted that “nothing is known of
the manner in which Al-Thani (Bin Muhammad) had by 1868, predominant influence in Qatar.”7
The rise of Muhammad Al-Thani can be seen as a symbolic parallel to Qatar's rise in
modern times. Sheikh Mohammad Al-Thani's rise, however, was not by mistake; it was as a
result of deliberate calculations, and an in-depth understanding of the need to posture himself as
a valuable asset to the British Empire. With the British Empire recognizing Muhammed Al-Thani
as the leader of Qatar, the next step was to consolidate his power internally.
6
7

Fromherz, Allen J. Qatar Rise to Power and Influence. IB Tauris, 2012.
Fromherz, Allen J. Qatar: A Modern History. Georgetown University Press, 2017.
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Although the British had developed good relations with Qatar and had substantial
influence over its affairs, the Ottoman Empire still sought to incorporate Qatar as part of its
territory. Muhammad bin Thani, the leader of Qatar, remained an ally to Britain, however, the
Ottomans, in a bid to weaken British influence, recognized his eldest son Jassim Al-Thani as
ruler. This move by the Ottomans was significant, because at this time, Muhammad bin Thani
was old, and his son Jassim Al-Thani was the de facto ruler of Qatar. Despite attempts by the
British and the Ottomans to cause a fractious relationship between Muhammed bin Thani and his
son Jassim Al-Thani, the Al-Thani's were able to balance the interest of the opposing sides by
playing them off each other.8 The balancing act carried out by the Al-Thani‟s, has set the tone for
Qatar's hedging tactic in its international relations today.
After the death of Mohammed bin Thani, his son Jassim bin Mohammed Al-Thani, who
had been the de facto leader, took full control as ruler of Qatar. His rule is symbolic in the history
of Qatar, and he has been recognized as the genuine founder of the State of Qatar.9 He led Qatar
through various significant events that characterized the period of his administration. Under his
reign, Qatar faced numerous attacks from neighboring tribes, such as the Bani Hajir, Naim,
Manasir and Awamir tribes.10 Jassim also experienced stiff opposition from the leaders of
Bahrain and Abu Dhabi, and in fact, was imprisoned by the ruler of Bahrain, after he traveled to
Bahrain to discuss the capture of some of his countrymen. His capture led Qatar to war with
Bahrain, and he was later released in exchange for Bahraini prisoners.11
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Fromherz, Allen J. Qatar: A Modern History. Georgetown University Press, 2017.
“Our History.” Qatar National Day
web.archive.org/web/20120110191814/http://www.ndqatar.com/english/qatar/pages/ourhistory.aspx
10
“Doha and Bidda 1871-1915: The Re-Establishment of Ottoman Rule.” The Origins of Doha and Qatar Project,
originsofdoha.wordpress.com/history-of-doha/doha-and-bidda-1871-1915-the-re-establishment-of-ottoman-rule
11
Lockerbie, John. “History of the Peninsula.” Islamic Design, Catnaps.Org, www.catnaps.org/islamic/design.html
9
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Jassim‟s diplomatic skills have been credited as part of the major reasons why Qatar was
able to emerge as an independent entity, despite strong competitions from the Ottoman and
British Empires to subjugate Qatar under their rule. Jassim was able to maintain a steady
relationship with the Ottomans, while simultaneously opposing the imperialistic tendencies of
Britain. However, Jassim‟s relationship with the Ottoman Empire began to deteriorate, especially
after the Ottomans refused to aid him in his expedition to reclaim Al Khor (now a municipality in
Qatar) from Abu Dhabi‟s occupation.12 Qatar's relationship with the Ottomans was strained even
further, as Jassim Al Thani stopped paying taxes to the Ottoman Empire, in order to protest
certain administrative reforms.13
The Ottomans responded by arresting Jassim Al Thani's brother. Fearing the possibility of
death or imprisonment, Jassim Al Thani fled to Al Wajbah with some tribesmen. Having captured
his brother, the Ottomans moved to capture Jassim Al Thani in Al Wajbah, sending a force of
about 200 soldiers, 100 mounted gendarmes and 40 cavalries.14 However, the Ottoman army
came under unexpected fire from Qatari troops, in what is now known as the battle of Al Wajbah.
The battle of Al Wajbah represents a significant time in Qatar‟s historical quest, for
independence and political freedom.
The Qatari soldiers decisively defeated the Ottoman troops, leading to the waning down
of Ottoman influence in Qatar. By the turn of the twentieth century, the Ottoman Empire was in
rapid decline, leaving Britain as the dominant power in the region. This gave way to the signing
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“Doha and Bidda 1871-1915: The Re-Establishment of Ottoman Rule.” The Origins of Doha and Qatar Project,
originsofdoha.wordpress.com/history-of-doha/doha-and-bidda-1871-1915-the-re-establishment-of-ottoman-rule
13
Ibid
14
“Doha and Bidda 1871-1915: The Re-Establishment of Ottoman Rule.” The Origins of Doha and Qatar Project,
originsofdoha.wordpress.com/history-of-doha/doha-and-bidda-1871-1915-the-re-establishment-of-ottoman-rule
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of the Anglo-Ottoman convention of 1913, which limited the jurisdiction of the Ottoman Empire
in the Persian Gulf states, also relinquishing its right to Qatar.15
By 1916, the British Empire and Sheikh Abdullah Bin Jasmin Al-Thani, the new ruler of
Qatar, signed the Anglo-Qatari treaty. This treaty effectively made Qatar a protectorate of the
British Empire and ensured British commitment to protect Qatar against aggression, especially
from Ibn Saud Abdul-Aziz, who was to later become the future king of Saudi Arabia. The need to
protect Qatar from the aggressive territorial expansion of Ibn Saud was key in the calculus of the
British Empire. This was because the British viewed him as a potential ally of the Ottoman
Empire, which by this time were adversaries of Britain as a result of World War One.
The prospect of Qatar being absorbed into the territorial space of Saudi Arabia was very
plausible. Qatar also feared the spread of Saudi Arabia's Wahhabi ideology, which could
potentially bring Qatar under the ideological influence of the Saudi Kingdom. Even till now,
Qatar makes a distinction between its “Wahhabism of the sea,” as opposed to Saudi Arabia‟s
“Wahhabism of the land,” to maintain its separate identity from Saudi Arabia.16
The 1916 Anglo-Qatari treaty was very symbolic in establishing Qatar's leadership
structure. It formally recognized Sheikh Abdullah Bin Jasmin Al-Thani, as the ruler of Qatar, and
the Al-Thani clan as the ruling family in Qatar. Despite the treaty, Sheikh Abdullah Bin Jasmin
Al-Thani still felt that the British did not offer Qatar enough protection from Bin Saud, and that
his position as ruler was not secured from internal dissent.17 This was true because, the British
Empire was reluctant to get entangled in the leadership selection of Qatar, viewing it more as a
family affair.
15

Wilkinson, John. C. Arabia's Frontiers: The Story of Britain's Boundary Drawing in the Desert. London: I B.
Tauris. 1991, Goggle Books, books.google.com/books/about/Arabia_s_Frontiers.html?id=NtdtAAAAMAAJ
16
Baskan, Birol and Steven Wright. “Seeds of Change: Comparing State-Religion Relations in Qatar and Saudi
Arabia.” Arab Studies Quarterly, vol. 33, no. 2, 2011, pp. 96-111
17
Fromherz, Allen J. Qatar: A Modern History. Georgetown University Press, 2017.
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With the discovery of oil, Qatar's political and economic value increased, and various oil
companies were interested in seeking oil concessions from Sheikh Abdullah. Sheikh Abdullah
used this development to encourage competition with the British Empire and its Anglo Persian
Oil Company (APOC), which also wanted oil concessions. With the advent of big American oil
companies such as Standard oil California, Britain became alarmed. The British Empire pressed
Abdullah to grant concessions to APOC, in other to prevent the United States from gaining the
upper hand in oil negotiations.
Sheikh Abdullah's tactic of encouraging competition between various oil companies and
Britain worked in his favor. He was able to secure British commitments to protect Qatar from the
aggressive territorial expansion of Saudi Arabia and also quell internal dissent by gaining British
assurance to recognize his favorite son, Hamad bin Abdallah as heir apparent.18 In a sudden turn
of events, Hamad died and Abdallah abdicated the throne to his other son, Sheikh Ahmad bin AlThani. However, Sheikh Ahmad was more interested in spending his time in Europe than
governing at home. This paved way for his nephew Sheikh Khalifa bin Hamad Al Thani the
crown prince to consolidate his power, by carrying out a bloodless coup against his uncle.
Sheikh Khalifa is a symbolic figure in Qatar, in that he announced Qatar's independence
from Britain, and also withdrew from the 1916 Anglo-Qatari treaty, which effectively ended
British control over Qatar.19 However, he did not reveal secret negotiations with the United
States to replace the UK as the special military protector for Qatar, and the ruling family.20 This
phase of Qatar's history is valued by its people and celebrated as the dawn of Qatar's statehood
and political maturity.

18

Fromherz, Allen J. Qatar: A Modern History. Georgetown University Press, 2017.
Ibid
20
Ibid
19
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The geopolitical landscape of Qatar drastically changed after the crown prince, Sheikh
Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani, ousted his father Sheikh Khalifa in a bloodless coup. This move
sent tremors to many Gulf leaders, especially Saudi Arabia. This was due to the independent
foreign policies that Hamad bin Khalifa had always advocated, which opposed those of Saudi
Arabia.21 Hamad Bin Khalifa was the expression of a younger generation of Qatari's, which
sought to diversify Qatar's international relations and break from Saudi Arabia's sphere of
influence. The reign of Emir Hamad Al-Thani, saw Qatar become a very active actor regionally
and internationally, which Saudi Arabia believed was an attempt to shrink its clout.
Hamad Bin Khalifa's ambition to shift Qatar away from its vassal status to Saudi Arabia
was due to certain factors. One of which was his experience as a military commander in the first
Gulf war. He witnessed firsthand Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, and the inability of Saudi Arabia as
the de facto leader of its Gulf allies to deter Iraq or protect Kuwait. In this light, Hamad Bin
Khalifa along with the younger generation of Qatari leaders resented the fact, that Qatar was
made to pay homage to Saudi Arabia, even though their security could not be guaranteed.22
Another factor was Qatar's need for a dominant protector over its territory, especially since the
British abdicated its position as the preeminent power in the Gulf. Noteworthy, was also the
desire of the younger generation to turn Qatar into a regional power, and to a large extent, a
global player in world affairs.
Hamad Al-Thani's reign sent a clear signal to the Middle East particularly, the GCC axis
that Qatar was pushing for a more prominent role in the region, and on the international stage. In
light of this, he began implementing initiatives that naturally would not have been taken without

21

Cockburn, Patrick. “Emir of Qatar Deposed by His Son. Palace Coup: Sheikh, Overthrown in Bloodless Takeover
While on Visit to Geneva, Vows to Return.” Independent, 28 June 1995, www.independent.co.uk/news/world/emirof-Qatar-deposed-by-his-son-1588698.html
22
Kamrava, Mehran. Qatar: Small State, Big Politics. Cornell University Press, 2013.
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the implicit or explicit consent of the Saudi led GCC block. Initiatives such as the establishment
of Al Jazeera, a western-style media network, which was a complete departure from the norm in
scope and coverage, as well as Qatar's rapprochement with Israel, were unprecedented in the
region.
Hamad Bin Al Thani also began developing Qatar's natural gas resources, which has
become its main source of income. Qatar has been able to carve out a niche for itself in the Arab
world, with its various ventures and pragmatic policies, which give it an asymmetric advantage
to cope with its geopolitical environment. Though Qatar is an absolute monarchy, it flirts with
democracy as a way to disassociate itself from its Gulf neighbor's, and prove to western
countries like the United States that Qatar is uniquely different.
In 2013, Qatar's ruler Emir Hamad bin Khalifa demonstrated Qatar's distinction from the
Middle East mainstream by transferring power to his son the crowned prince. In a region known
for leaders that die on the seat of power, Qatar sets another first. The decision by Emir Hamad, to
abdicate the throne in favor of his younger son, might have been connected with his experience
as a leader, who had to remove his father from the throne. In this light, he intended to create
precedence for future generations of leaders to follow in terms of succession, preventing the use
of coups as a way to gain power. This example goes a long way to show how Sheikh Hamad has
been able to bring order and structure in his household, which also reflects positively for his
country as a whole.

12

Significance of Qatar's Geopolitical History on its Strategic Calculus in its International
Relations
Qatar's history gives stunning insights into its experiences and how it shapes Qatar‟s view
of the world. Qatar has experienced firsthand the challenges associated with small states finding
their footing in a world described by Thucydides, where “the strong do what they can and the
weak suffer what they must."23 Qatar has indeed been on the receiving end for much of its
history. Located in a complex geopolitical region, Qatar's neighbors often saw Qatar as a prize up
for grabs and did not accord it the respect and status given to legitimate states.
Some scholars and historians have described Qatar‟s achievement of statehood as
miraculous, and somewhat lucky, given the challenges it had to face. Its emergence as a coherent
political entity is a raw display of ambition, skilled use of diplomacy, and visionary leadership,
all employed by taking advantage of different opportunities. These traits still characterize the
strategic culture of Qatar today.
Qatar's history has shaped it to see the protection of its sovereignty as a primary security
objective, even going through unorthodox routes to secure it from the external influences of
hostile forces. Since Qatar has faced many incursions into its territory for a substantive part of its
history, Qatari leaders have become adept at deciphering the political and security climate to
maneuver the various threats to its sovereignty. Leaders thus make perceptive decisions with
whom to ally, making cost-benefit calculations as to which domineering regional power poses
the most threat, and which would provide protection with the least onerous demands.24

23

Barry, James A. The Sword of Justice: Ethics and Coercion in International Politics. Greenwood Publishing
Group, 1998. Google Books, books.google.com/books?id=8iOPAAAAMAAJ
24
Roberts, David B. “The Four Areas of Qatar‟s Foreign Policy.” Comilas Journal for International Relations, no. 5,
2016, pp. 1-17. revistas.upcomillas.es/index.php/internationalrelations/article/download/6740/6544
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In the late-18th and early-19th centuries, these decisions were made and remade quickly,
and alliance structures changed frequently.25 This also holds particularly true in the twentieth and
twenty-first centuries. Qatar has moved away from its traditional reliance on Britain and Saudi
Arabia as it regional protector since the aftermath of the Gulf war, which changed Qatar‟s
attitude towards its security and international relations. Qatar believed Saudi Arabia offered little
in terms of security and demanded too much of its sovereignty. Thus, Qatar's history points to the
fact that in times of challenges, Qatar is open to switching alliances to serve its interest.
Qatar‟s enormous wealth is an integral part of its success as a country, and Qatar‟s history
reflects the strategic use of this wealth as a tool to achieve many of its foreign policies.
According to the international monetary fund, Qatar‟s per capita GDP is $127,600, making it the
richest country on earth.26 With large reserves of oil and gas, Qatar has been able to attract
investments from countries, which enhances Qatar‟s strategic value to those countries such as the
U.S.A and Britain. (More information on Qatar‟s strategic use of its wealth and investments will
be given below).
As a country previously “known for being unknown,” Qatar‟s wealth serves as a fuel for
Qatar‟s policies that have transformed the small state, from a position of a political dwarf to a
major actor in international affairs with its independent foreign policy.27 As part of its strategic
calculus to be visible, Qatar‟s financial resources have succeeded in attracting the needed
attention, sufficient to increase its political standing in the international arena. In this light,
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Qatar‟s uses its wealth to power many of its foreign policies that are geared towards increasing
its clout regionally and globally.

Understanding Qatar's Need for Asymmetric Tools
Qatar's Geography and Size. With a total size of 11,586 sq. km, Qatar is easily one of
the smallest nations in the Middle East. The size of Qatar relative to its Gulf neighbors, such as
Saudi Arabia and Iran, can be easily seen as insignificant. Qatar‟s size is particularly important in
light of the realities and dynamics of security, politics, and economy. The role of size in the
security and economic potential of a country cannot be overemphasized.
Geo-politicians such as Sir Halford Mackinder, Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan, Karl
Haushofer and Nicholas J. Spykeman, attached great importance to geography.28 The geography
of a country plays an essential role in the security calculus of that country. For instance, the Alps
of Switzerland was a great insulator against the extraordinary destruction that bedeviled Europe,
both in World War One and World War Two. The same goes for India, which has been guarded
by the great Himalayas in the north and surrounded by sea or ocean, and thus, enjoys a bit of
protection and avoids frequent foreign invasion.29 In the case of Qatar, however, its geographical
realities and size, places it at a strategic disadvantage, as it offers no natural protection against
threats.
Qatar is shaped by constant geographical extremes.30 As a country located in the desert,
Qatar's agricultural potential is significantly dwarfed. This leaves Qatar very vulnerable to
economic insecurity caused by food scarcity. According to the Food and Agricultural
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Organization of the United Nations, Qatar's “agricultural sector is limited by several factors, such
as scarce water resources, low water quality, unfertile soils, harsh climatic conditions, and poor
water management, which leads to low crop yields.”31 Qatar's arable land is estimated at just
three percent of the total area of the country,32 making it almost infeasible to become selfsufficient in the productions of its crops.
Although there is a small amount of cultivated land in the north of the country, and there
have been many attempts at desert agriculture, only some five percent of the land can be used for
herding and grazing.33 Qatar's water resources are also very limited, with an annual rainfall of
75mm (3 inches), compared to London‟s average of 558mm (22 inches); Mumbai‟s of 2431mm
(96 inches) and New York‟s of 1268mm (50 inches).34
Qatar's size also places it at a disadvantage in times of war or conflict. As a state with a
minuscule territory, Qatar lacks the strategic depth needed to directly, and confidently confront
adversaries, without running the risks of being overtaken in a short period. Qatari leaders are
acutely aware of this fact, having witnessed the rapid capture of Kuwait by Iraq due to its small
size.
Qatar’s Geopolitical Realities. There are only a few places on earth that can be
compared to the regional, political, and religious complexities of the Middle East. The
geopolitical dynamics of the Middle East, often leave political scientist and international
relations scholars overwhelmed, due to the intricate relationships that exist between, and among
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regional and international actors. In this light, Qatar is fully aware of its vulnerabilities in such
rough geopolitical terrain as a small state.
Qatar is one of the world's most vulnerable political entities, surrounded by powerful and
expansionist neighbors.35 Qatar is bordered by Saudi Arabia and shares maritime borders with
Bahrain, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates.36 Among the nations that share land or maritime
borders with Qatar, Qatar is one of the smallest in size, military, and population. This makes
Qatar an easy target in times of chaos like it has been for a substantial period of its history. In this
light, the goal of survival characterizes Qatar‟s interactions and relationship with its neighbors
and the Middle East in general. Survival in the face of coercion, disputes, and wars of which, it
often gets caught in the middle. This strategic goal of survival is highly evident because of its
geographic position.
Qatar is located between Iran and Saudi Arabia, which are historic, religious, and political
rivals. This leaves Qatar in the crosshairs of bitter wars and disputes often fought by these two
states. The conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran, while historical and religious in origin, has
evolved into a geopolitical competition.37 Saudi Arabia, as the predominant Sunni state and the
custodian of the two most holy sites in Islam, finds it necessary, and in fact, pertinent to curtail
the influence of Iran. Iran, on the other hand, the foremost Shia power since the Islamic
revolution of 1971, has been on a geopolitical rampage to increase its sphere of influence. The
competition between Iran and Saudi Arabia, often lead to dicey situations for Qatar, which has to
walk a fine line navigating its relationships between these antagonistic countries.
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Worse still for Qatar, is its sixty-kilometer border with Saudi Arabia, which is Qatar's
only land border, and by implication a very important port for the movement of goods and
services. The border holds a strategic place in Qatar's calculus, due to its fluctuating relationship
with Saudi Arabia, which has direct consequences for its economy, because of Saudi Arabia's
ability to manipulate the borders to hurt Qatar. This scenario is currently playing out, as Saudi
Arabia has closed its border to Qatar because of the 2017 GCC crisis.38
As part of the geopolitical realities surrounding Qatar, it has to contend with the fact, that
the exercise of its sovereignty has become a source of gross discontent among the Saudi Arabia
dominated axis of the Middle East. Nevertheless, Qatar is determined to carve out a niche for
itself, distinct from the mainstream of Arab politics.
Demographics and Population. The population and the demographic composition of a
state is a very important metric for measuring the economic and the military potential of that
state. Qatar has been experiencing phenomenal growth in its population size due to high levels of
immigration. The website of the Central Intelligence Agency, estimates Qatar‟s population to be
2,363,569.39 However, immigrants make up about 88.4 percent of the population, the majority of
which, are low skilled workers from South Asia, while Qatari's make up only 11.6 percent.40
Qatar‟s population growth is a mirror image of its success and relevance as a major
economic and socio-cultural hub, especially, considering the fact, that by 1940, the entire
population of Qatar had fallen to 16,000 due to extreme poverty.41 As Qatar continues to develop
its economy and infrastructures, through its abundance of oil and gas, expatriate workers play
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very important roles in its workforce, particularly in the low skilled sectors. The need for
expatriate workers has also increased due to Qatar's hosting right to the 2022 world cup, which
has tremendously augmented the need for construction.42
However, Qatar‟s population size poses a deep challenge to its security, because, it is
insufficient to create an adequate military force to defend its territory or deter adversaries.
Qatar's total military strength is 12,000, which is relatively small when compared to its
neighbors; Saudi Arabia totals 256,000 while Iran has a total of 934,000. This makes Qatar
vulnerable to aggression, or invasion. In this light, the strength of Qatar‟s military or security
apparatus cannot guarantee its security.
This vulnerability is a major reason Qatar has always sought defense alliances with
stronger states. Qatar's defense architecture is often interwoven to those of these dominant states,
in the form of trade and military bases. For instance, the United States has military bases in
Qatar, in part because; Qatar created the right conditions for them. The deficiency of a strong
population for military purposes is a factor that Qatar considers in its strategic decisions and
international relations.
Leadership Ambitions. Modern-day Qatar is a product of vision and ambition on the
part of its leadership. For an extensive part of its history, Qatar was contented with the limited
role it played in international affairs, differing to Saudi Arabia for regional leadership. This
arrangement was the norm, until Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani became Emir of Qatar,
through a bloodless coup that ousted his father, Sheikh Khalifa bin Hamad Al Thani in 1995.43
Sheikh Hamad schooled in Sandhurst military academy, London, and was appointed to the rank
of Major General, and later Commander-in-Chief of the Qatari Armed Forces, overseeing a
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major recruitment and resources drive.44 Under his leadership as an army commander, he
defeated Iraqi forces at the Battle of Khafji in the first Gulf war, earning Qatar significant praise
from world leaders.
Sheikh Hamad had an intense passion to develop the international clout of Qatar away
from Saudi Arabia, and the mainstream of Gulf politics that sought to keep it in the shadows. In
this light, he began developing the architecture of Qatar's rapid rise and growth in diverse
sectors, such as the economy, education, and media. Sheikh Hamad's cousin, Hamad bin Jassim
bin Jabir, who was the foreign minister from 1992-2013 and prime minister from 2007-2013,
was also a key ally in the grand plan to get Qatar to its current international status. Although,
Sheikh Hamad has handed over power to his son, Tamim Bin Hamad Al Thani, and other
younger crop of Qataris, Qatar's fundamental foreign policy has not changed. The new Emir still
pursues the same maverick policies that his father designed, which still forms the basis of Qatar's
international relations today.
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QATAR'S ASYMMETRIC TOOLS IN ACHIEVING ITS FOREIGN POLICIES

Strategic Hedging Among Competing Actors
Strategic hedging can be defined as “a behavior, in which a country seeks to offset risks
by pursuing multiple foreign policy options that are intended to produce mutually counteracting
effects, under the situation of high uncertainties and high stakes.”45 In this regard, veteran
American military analysts Anthony Cordsman described “Qatar as a country of opposites” using
a strategy that “depends on the careful balancing of many competing forces.”46
Qatar's survival as a state has hinged largely on its flexibility and adaptability to its
geopolitical surrounding. In a global stage saturated with actors with diverse competing interest,
Qatar manages to pull through, not by technological superiority, but through the deft use of
diplomacy and negotiation.47 Balancing its interest and relationships among diverse actors,
through strategic hedging is a prime tool for Qatar in achieving its foreign policies.
Qatar's former foreign minister, Khalid bin Mohammed Al Atiyah, voiced in clear terms,
the basis for Qatar's hedging policy in its international relations. He stated that “we don't do
enemies...we talk to everyone. We cannot change geography; this is for sure, so whoever is in the
vicinity of our geography has to be our close friend.” This statement by the ex-minister gives
considerable insights, into Qatar's paradoxical approach in its international interactions. For this
reason, much of Qatar's foreign policy lurks in the gray area, leaving allies and partners
perplexed as to Qatar's stance on regional and international issues.
As a member of the Gulf Cooperation Council, Qatar is politically aligned with its Arab
Sunni neighbors, which are also allies of the United States. In its classic hedging policy, Qatar
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also maintains a robust relationship with Iran. However, this relationship is anchored to a large
extent, on the world biggest gas field, which Qatar shares with Iran. As noted in a leaked U.S.
diplomatic cable, Qatar's relationship with Iran is “seen as an expression of Qatar's strong desire
for a stable strategic environment and for a working relationship with Iran, that ensures Qatar's
continued freedom to share the two countries shared gas field, the largest non-associated gas
field in the world.”48 Qatar's policy towards Iran is thus, crafted with this economic reality in
mind.
Qatar is well aware of Iran's penchant for destabilizing the political atmosphere of Arab
states and seeks to avoid it. In this light, Qatar's deems it necessary to maintain a cordial
relationship with Iran, no matter how tenuous it might be. Qatar is also mindful of the position of
the United States regarding the destabilizing regional, and international activities of Iran.
However, Qatar still advocates for Iran diplomatically. This is because, as an ally of the United
States Qatar has been subject to numerous threats from Iran. For Example, Iran's ex-President
Ahmadinejad, once warned Qatar in a private meeting in Tehran, that it would be a primary
target in the event of a war with America, or Israel as a result of hosting United States Central
Command (CENTCOM) in Qatar. 49 This geopolitical reality is what Qatar hopes to mitigate
through hedging in its relationship with Iran and its allies.
Qatar has also been using its hedging policy to balance its relationship between Iran and
its GCC allies in the Syrian crisis. Qatar plays an active role like the rest of the Gulf States to
oust Basher Al Assad, which is a key ally of Iran. However, Qatar still views Iran as a partner of
convenience and keeps a substantial window open for communication and diplomatic
engagements. The aftermath of the 2017 GCC crisis showed the importance of this window. Iran
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was quick to send cargo planes of food, fruits, and vegetables, in the wake of Saudi blockade of
Qatar's only land border.
In this light, it is no surprise that Qatar having degraded its diplomatic presence in Iran
for some years has now fully restored diplomatic relations with the Islamic republic. Even
though the Gulf monarchies view Iran as an existential threat, Qatar's hedging policy has largely
lessened the possibility of an aggressive move from Iran against it. Qatar has also proved adept
at navigating the murky waters of U.S.-Iran tensions, as it strives to maintain cordial relations
with both countries.
A key manifestation of Qatar's hedging policy is in its relationship with Islamist groups
and individuals, who like Iran, are loathed by the Gulf monarchies and the United States. Qatar
has been known to provide a haven for Islamist groups and individuals, considered terrorists by
its allies. It has been reported that Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the notorious terrorist that
masterminded the 9/11 attacks, was given refuge in Qatar, by a Qatari royal and former interior
minister.50
In its hedging fashion, Qatar hosts the largest U.S. airbase in the region and pledges its
support in the U.S. led fight against terrorism, but Qatar has also found a way to legitimize the
presence of a political office for the Taliban within its territory. An author with the New York
Post expressed his surprise, while engaged in a conversation with an expat in Qatar after he “told
me that he attended the opening of an IKEA store in Doha, and watched dumbfounded as Taliban
members tested out the same couch as U.S. servicemen.”51 This imagery of friend and foe is
Qatar's vision of hedging, where Qatar is a neutral zone for conflicting parties.
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Qatar's engagement with Islamist organizations such as the Muslim Brotherhood, Al
Nusra also known as Jabhat al-Nusra, and Hamas, is part of a wider plan to observe the political
trend of the region. It has been widely reported that Qatar also has links to the Islamic State and
Al Qaeda.52 Qatar's relationship with Islamist groups is predicated on a political bet that Qatar
made, on an assumption that Islamist movements and parties will become the premier bloc of
power in the region.53 Qatar also uses this classic hedging policy to strategically oscillate,
between actors it perceives as having the political and ideological upper hand in the region.
This calculus largely explains Qatar's support for the Muslim Brotherhood, while being
an ally of the United States, and a political partner of many Arab states, most of which oppose
the Brotherhood. Qatar has come to appreciate the organizational capacity, and populist appeals,
the Muslim Brotherhood garners in the region, despite the fact, that Qatar‟s allies disdain the
Brotherhood. Qatar has been a sanctuary for key Muslim Brotherhood figures, including Yusuf
al-Qaradawi, its spiritual and ideological leader. Yusuf al-Qaradawi resides in Qatar and conveys
his views on a weekly show called Sharia and Life on the Al Jazeera network.54 Hamas, which
has been designated a terrorist organization by the United States, has also been a major recipient
of aid, and political legitimacy from Qatar in the form of “humanitarian assistance.”
For Qatar, these groups are strategic to its stability and are part of a broader plot to shape
the geopolitical outlook of the Middle East to a more “Qatar friendly” region, especially since
the Arab Spring showed their potential as a political force. Qatar views these Islamist
organizations, as wild cards that might prove useful at the right time. A practical example was
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Qatar's support for Egypt's President Morsi‟s administration, who was a member of the Muslim
Brotherhood. Qatar intended to pivot on the Muslim Brotherhood‟s success in Egypt, as a
starting point to further its strategic reach in the wake of the Arab Spring.55 Qatar‟s deep tie with
the Muslim Brotherhood has also raised the confidence of the Qatari leadership, that it can
control the political decisions of Islamist organizations. Unlike the old order of autocrats that rule
the region, Qatar sees Islamists as more approachable politically.
Qatar's Alliance with the Brotherhood and its affiliates, also serves as a hedge against the
dominance of Saudi Arabia, not just politically, but also ideologically. Qatar prefers the
ideological construct of the Muslim Brotherhood, to the very austere Wahhabi ideology of the
Saudi's.56 Qatar believes that the Muslim Brotherhood gives it a populist form of legitimacy,
needed to rival the religious prowess associated with Saudi Arabia as the keepers of the holiest
sites in Islam. Qatar also uses hedging as a strategic policy to test out the geopolitical
foundations of the Middle East. This helps Qatar detect, which actor or trend holds a firm and
strategically strong solid ground for Qatar to further its geopolitical influence.

The use of Al Jazeera as a Political tool of Influence and Power
The use of the media is one of Qatar's most strategically potent tools in amplifying its
influence, and shaping geopolitical perceptions and directions, regionally and internationally.
Qatari emir, Hamad Al Thani, created the Al Jazeera network in 1996, as part of a strategic plan
to challenge the conservative status quo of the Middle East, by bringing to light, thoughts,
aspirations, political, and social perspectives from a Qatar point of view. The creation of Al
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Jazeera network marked the beginning of a new era in Qatar's interaction and international
relations. Al Jazeera has become the gateway through which the Qatari leadership can reach a
substantive population of the Arab world to influence the political, social, and cultural narratives
on a scale that is ordinarily far above its weight.
As a new tool in the hands of Emir Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, Al Jazeera was first
used strategically to deflect the stinging criticisms directed at him from the Saudi led media, after
ousting his father through a bloodless palace coup in 1995.57 The Saudi elites supported his
father as a loyal pawn of Saudi Arabia. However, the Saudi leadership despised the new emir for
his pro-active and independent foreign policies. Thus, Al Jazeera became a powerful weapon in
the hands of the Emir to shield himself and his country from being painted as a pariah. Al Jazeera
has now become the global mouthpiece of Qatar's leadership.
The creation of Al Jazeera was facilitated by journalists from the fall out of BBC Arabic
TV station, which no longer had access to Saudi provided satellite, after strong Saudi objection
to its critical reporting on its ruling elites.58 Al Jazeera became an instant success story in just
five years. By 2001, Al Jazeera had succeeded in becoming the most watched Arab television
station for news, and within ten years, more than three-quarters of Arabs identified Al Jazeera as
being either their first or second choice for news.59
The rapid success of Al Jazeera was due to its appeal to the hearts and minds of the larger
Arab population, who yearned for “real news,” as opposed to the doctored programs they had to
watch in mainstream Arab media outlets. The news products and programs that were mostly
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broadcast from most Arab state-controlled media, were nothing more than documentaries on the
“goodness and mercies” of the Arab rulers, while “real” news and events were filtered to protect
the rulers and advance their immediate interests.60 However, Al Jazeera like its founders became
a three hundred and sixty degree break from the norm. It was instituted by the Emir to "report the
news as they see it."61
Al Jazeera covered news that were of deep concern to the average Arab individual, such
as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and the U.S. anti-terror campaign, which led to the second Gulf
war against Iraq. Its critical coverage of Arab rulers, not even sparing the Saudi Arabia regime,
did not go unnoticed, even though critical coverage of Qatar was conspicuously missing. Al
Jazeera soon became a source of worry for many leaders in the region. In 1999, when the
longtime Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak visited its cramped studios, he was said to have
remarked in utter shock that, “all that noise from this matchbox?”62
The strategic nature of Al Jazeera was described in one of the leaked cables by American
diplomats in Doha it stated, “Al Jazeera is heavily subsidized by the Qatari government and has
proved an effective tool for the station‟s political masters.”63 In another leaked document, Al
Jazeera was described as an “instrument of Qatari influence...an expression of Qatar‟s foreign
policy.”64
Qatar uses Al Jazeera in a variety of ways that are tailored to meet its goal. One of which
is to implement a distinct blend of contradictory foreign policies, meant to produce different
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outcomes that serve its overall strategic interest. In this light Al Jazeera as a media platform
supports Qatar's contrasting messages, values, and political positions which it deems necessary
to achieve its goals and objectives. For example, Qatar's foreign policy supported the Arab
Spring by pushing for democracy, while simultaneously supporting extremist and Islamist
ideologies, which are usually not associated with democracy. Qatar actively used its Al Jazeera
network to support this conflicting policy, by giving voice to the massive protests that were
taking place in different Arab countries, while simultaneously, giving considerable airtime to
certain Islamist and extremist movements that appeal to the Arab public.
Although the very notion of supporting democracy and extremist ideology is inconsistent,
to say the least, Qatar took advantage of the uniqueness of the Arab Spring to pursue this policy.
The Arab Spring was unique in the sense that Arab protesters yearned for democracy, and
representative government, however, the majority of these protesters supported Islamist
movements and parties to lead these democratic reforms.65 This odd mix of democracy and
extremism gelled well with Qatar's strategic objective of gaining influence in the region. In this
light, Qatar sought to change the geopolitical landscape of the Middle East to make it more
strategically advantageous for its objectives by supporting Islamist's movements and parties.
Qatar's relationship with Islamist leaders and movements has to be understood to
appreciate its support for these groups during the Arab Spring; the Muslim Brotherhood been the
most prominent of them. Qatar's ties to the Muslim Brotherhood dates back to the arrival of
Yusuf Al Qaradawi in Qatar, after his exile from Egypt.66 Qaradawi is the spiritual and
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ideological leader of the Muslim Brotherhood movement. His views on politics, women‟s right,
and a host of other issues are highly controversial and have been known to support acts of
terrorism. He has been credited with much of the religious, and educational reforms in Qatar, and
has a very close relationship with the ruling family.
His program Sharia and Life on Al Jazeera is reputed to be one of the most popular
programs in the Arab world, attracting millions of viewers.67 He is the founder of the Islamic
Union of Muslim Scholars, which is headquartered in Qatar. Qaradawi is also known to use his
influence in the Arab world to support Qatar, adding to Qatar's influence. To this end, the Qatari
Leadership has not hidden its intentions of integrating extremist and Islamist, into the political
fabric of the Middle East, especially the Muslim Brotherhood.
In an interview with Al Jazeera, former emir, Hamad bin Al Thani, downplayed the
concerns normally associated with extremist and Islamist organizations. He instead blamed the
radical views of these movements on tyrannical governments, and believed that if offered
democracy Islamist movements will embrace participatory politics.68 Going further, he stated
that if the promise of real democracy, and justice of the Arab Spring is fulfilled, “I believe you
will see this extremism transform into civilian life and civil society.”69
In line with this oxymoronic view of transforming extremism into civilian life, Qatar
utilized Al Jazeera as a rebranding tool to paint extremists as moderates, and make them more
appealing to the already receptive Arab populace. Yusuf Al Qaradawi was particularly
instrumental in garnering support for the Muslim Brotherhood, and its affiliates in different
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countries through Al Jazeera. He spoke out against the regime of former Egyptian President,
Hosni Mubarak on Al Jazeera, and was a key supporter of the Muslim Brotherhood president,
Mohammed Morsi.70
In a live interview on Al-Jazeera, lasting a full twenty-three minutes, Al-Qaradawi issued
a fatwa calling for the killing of late Libyan dictator Muʿammar al-Gaddafi.71 Noted, was the fact
that this fatwa tallied with the foreign policy of Qatar, which was to remove Gaddafi from power.
It is no surprise that throughout the Arab Spring, Qaradawi's fatwas were, for the most part,
broadcasted through Al Jazeera, and were never contradictory to Qatar's policies in the region.
Al Jazeera's interview with Abu Muhammed al-Joulani, the head of Syria's Al Qaeda's
franchise, the Al Nusra front, further buttresses Qatar's use of Al Jazeera as a “blending tool” for
the contrasting notion of extremism and good governance. Veteran Middle East journalist Diana
Moukalled noted that the interview “resembled propaganda because he was not challenged or
asked investigative questions,” she also observed that “the interview was between two people in
total harmony,” reinforcing the fact that Al Jazeera is a tool of Qatar's foreign policy.72
In this interview, al-Joulani presented himself and his organization as the paradoxical
“good Jihadist.”73 He declared that “We are not murderers, we are not criminals...we‟re standing
against tyranny (in Syria),” going further to reassure the west, he added that he will not “use
Syria for attacks against the West and Europe.”74 It has been widely reported that this public
relations stunt, was an attempt by the Qatari government to remove Al Nusra from the United
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States terror list, which prevented Qatar from supporting it financially. Within a short time after
this interview, Al Nusra announced also on Al Jazeera that it has cut ties to Al Qaeda, paving way
for more extensive support from the Qatari government.75
Qatar also uses Al Jazeera as a political foundation to advance its strategic objective, of
projecting power away from the mainstream of Arab politics, and traditional heavyweights led by
Saudi Arabia. Qatar has long been known to resent its historically subservient status to Saudi
Arabia, and actively takes measures to increase its reach through Al Jazeera. Al Jazeera's
willingness to go geopolitical leftist against the established order has been profound and reflects
Qatar's stance on a range of issues.
For example, in other to prove its political independence from Saudi Arabia, Qatar
permitted Al Jazeera to interview Israeli officials, even interviewing members of the Israeli
Knesset (parliament) to the amazement of the Arab world.76 Qatar cautiously seeks to maintain a
close and working relationship with Saudi Arabia. Nevertheless, it has not stopped Qatar from
pursuing policies that sometimes anger the Saudi's, in a bid to prove its political independence.
For instance, Al Jazeera has in the past granted interviews to dissidents of the Saudi Arabian
regime, much to the anger of the Saudi monarchy.
Al Jazeera is like a political mirror that reflects Qatar's position, feelings, and viewpoints
on different matters. For example, by watching Al Jazeera you can understand the overall health
of Qatar-Saudi relationship. In times of political tension between the two nations, Al Jazeera
tends to take a critical stance on Saudi Arabia, and in times of rapprochement and cooperation,
Al Jazeera has been known to strike a friendly tone on issues relating to Saudi Arabia.
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Finally, Al Jazeera is also used as a supplemental tool by the Qatari leadership to enhance
the strategic hedging policy of the Qatari government. This is done through the dual nature of Al
Jazeera, with its English and Arabic Channels intended to reach different audiences. The
language and messages that Al Jazeera carries through its different channels are vastly different.
The English version of Al Jazeera is a western oriented platform, through which Qatar brands,
and presents itself and its views to the western world.
However, the Arabic version of Al Jazeera is deliberately crafted to fit certain Arab
populist narratives, such as anti-Americanism and anti-Semitism, which allows Qatar to identify
on the side of the Arabic people.77 In other words, with Al Jazeera English Qatar is western,
while with Al Jazeera Arabic, Qatar is for the Arab masses even if it means identifying with
narratives that do not suit the interest of the United States. This is a classic strategy by Qatar,
which embodies the all too familiar use of conflicting policies meant to serve Qatar's interest.
Al Jazeera‟s anti-Semitism was first noticed in the aftermath of events such as its
coverage of the second Palestinian intifada against Israel in 2014. Al Jazeera deliberately framed
the conflict, calling Palestinians killed by Israeli soldiers‟ martyrs, while Israelis killed were just
called people.78 As noted by Arab scholar Fouad Ajami, Al-Jazeera‟s reporting “barely feigned
neutrality.”79 To further, sensationalize the event to stir up anti-Semitism, Al Jazeera repeatedly
played a disputed account of Israeli soldiers shooting a twelve-year-old Palestinian boy,
Mohammed al-Durra, and in fact, made it the emblem of the intifada.80
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During the 2014 standoff between Palestine and Israel, Al Jazeera was blatantly biased
and left no stone unturned in ensuring that its coverage was favorable to the Palestinian cause.81
According to Gulf scholar David Weinberg, the network followed guidelines released by Hamas‟
Interior Ministry on how to report the events in Gaza.82

In another flagrant show of anti-Semitism from al Jazeera, its Arabic channel threw a
party for Samir Kantar, a Lebanese man who killed three Israelis including a four-year-old girl in
1979, upon his repatriation in a prisoner exchange between Israel and Hezbollah.83 “Ghassan
Ben Jeddo, then the network‟s Beirut bureau chief, was filmed exclaiming, “Brother Samir, we
wish to celebrate with you.”84
However, the true ideological danger of Al Jazeera was brought to full display during
America's intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq. Al Jazeera's coverage of these events focused on
compelling graphics, showing the impact of America‟s military campaign on mosques, and even
going further by showing torn Qurans to incite religious fanatics.85 Al Jazeera's footage was
deliberately aimed at setting an agenda, to frame the event as an assault on the Islamic values,
and beliefs of these countries, which the United States laboriously sought to counter.
An Al Jazeera Arabic reporter on the ground in Afghanistan surrounded by rubles,
suggested, “Afghans are looking towards brothers of faith...to help free the country,” and
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wondered why Arab states and Muslims were satisfying “America's ignorance.”86 This was a
clear call for the Muslim world to attack the United States. Despite the effort of then President
George Bush in reaching out to Qatar‟s Emir Hamad bin Khalifa, the daunting, and biased
coverage of the U.S. was still the norm. Such sensational reporting reflects the beliefs and
attitude of Al Jazeera‟s staffs, which have been widely reported to be leftist, pan-Arab
nationalists, or Islamist.
Al Jazeera also gave ample coverage of Osama Bin Laden, who used the network as a
platform to reach the Arab world and incite its people against the United States. Al Jazeera
frequently obtained tapes from Al Qaeda quite questionably, and aired them unfiltered;
prompting the U.S. to the possibility, that Al Qaeda was utilizing Al Jazeera to send messages
across to its member using hidden languages and signs. Till this day, Al Jazeera still gives
considerable airtime to Islamist extremists and terrorist figures, all in the name of being
accommodating of different opinions.
In this regard, Yusuf Al Qaradawi looms large as a well-respected preacher and authority
in the Arab world. Millions watch his show on Al Jazeera, “sharia and life.”
He is an advocate for suicide bombing, calling it a duty greater than a right.87 Al Qaradawi
stated further “doubting it (suicide) is like joining the Zionists and Americans in condemning our
brothers in Hamas, the Jihad, the Islamic factions and the resistance factions in Iraq.”88
Beyond giving airtime to extremists, Al Jazeera incongruously attempts to re-brand
known terrorist organizations and individuals, by painting them as moderate. This was the case
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of Abu Mohammad Al Julani, the leader of the Al-Nusra front. A U.S.A designated terrorist
organization, with ties to Al Qaeda, and an active actor in the Syrian civil war. He was invited to
speak on Al Jazeera and was giving a public relations treatment by its interviewers, who were
reported to have been told not to associate Al Nusra with Al Qaeda. In this light, Al Jazeera
sought to give Al Nusra political legitimacy, internationally and regionally and might have
played into Al Qaeda‟s plan to normalize its presence in Syria.
Al Jazeera has now joined the social media space as Al Jazeera plus, which from all
indications continue to broadcast anti-Semitism shown in a video on its platform denying the
holocaust. The video now deleted claimed that Jews exploit the Holocaust and that Israel is the
genocide's "greatest beneficiary."89 Although, the journalists who were behind the video were
suspended, nevertheless, Al Jazeera has been churning out anti-Semitic tropes for a long time.90
These acts of targeted anti-Semitism and anti-Americanism, especially, on its Arabic channel are
deliberate ways Qatar appeals to its broad Arab population.

Investment and Branding
Qatar has been one of the most dynamic international investors in many regions of the
world, especially in Europe and the United States of America. With a Gross Domestic Product of
155.8 billion dollars,91 and a with Purchasing Power Parity of 129,126 U.S. Dollars, Qatar is
easily the richest nation in the world per capita.92 Oil and natural gas are Qatar's main economic
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engine and government source of revenue, driving Qatar‟s high economic growth and per capita
income levels.93 With a population of about 2.3 million people and an indigenous population of
about 300,000, Qatar's economy is able to survive any short or medium term political or
economic change to oil or gas given its solid sovereign wealth fund.
Qatar shares the world largest natural gas field with Iran, which it calls the north field,
with reserves projected to last tens of decades at the current production level.94 Qatar's economic
position as a leading exporter of liquefied natural gas is further strengthened, with the increase of
its customer base from seven in 2010, to twenty-one in 2013, with Asia remaining as the center
of its interest.95 Qatar's sovereign wealth fund is valued at 335 billion dollars, making it the
fourteenth largest sovereign wealth fund in the world.96 Qatar is a major investor in key areas,
such as technology, real estate, transportation, banking, and agriculture.
International investment is Qatar's unique way of diversifying its economy and increasing
the awareness for its “brand.” For Qatar, these investments are also a prime way it makes itself
relevant in the economic and political calculus of the states it chooses to invest in. In light of this,
Qatar created the Qatar Investment Authority (QIA) in 2005 to handle the country‟s windfall
from liquefied natural gas sales, of which it is the world‟s biggest exporter.97
The Qatar Investment Authority, according to its website is devoted to “investing and
managing the funds we are responsible for, in a professional, strategic and prudent manner; and
by simultaneously developing QIA into a dynamic, multinational, world-class organization.”98
The Qatar Investment Authority is committed to the aggressive expansion of its investments, not
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only in western economies, which has traditionally been its region of prime choice but also in
African countries.
Qatar's foreign policy objectives, in investing in different international markets, make its
decisions strategic. This is due to the nature and pattern of its investments, which target high
profile ventures in countries that are dominant in world affairs. Given its strong rationale for
investing in certain countries, Qatar's investment also serves as a second bottom line, which is
advancing Qatar's international standing with these countries.99 Qatar does this by investing in
countries that have strategic value militarily, and politically, with the goal that these countries
will extend such valuable assets to cover up for its deficiencies in those areas.
Just as Qatar was able to understand the international climate to forge closer and strategic
ties with the U.S., resulting in the Al Udeid base, Qatar also saw the global financial crisis as a
strategic opportunity to foster economic ties in Europe for strategic benefits. Qatar's grip in
strategic locations in Europe, especially in countries like Britain and France, makes Qatar a
major stakeholder in the economic input of these countries. Qatar intends to use this leverage in
times of strategic need. For instance, if Qatar is faced with an invasion similar to that of Kuwait,
countries enjoying Qatar‟s investments will be quick to respond in defense of Qatar.
Qatar's investment in London is extensive. In fact, it is hard to walk around London and
admire the sights without admiring something paid for by Qatar.100 Property research company,
Datscha, revealed that Qatar Investment Authority owns 879 commercial and residential
properties in London, of which about 26 million sq. ft. is commercial property.101 In all, Qatar's
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investment in the United Kingdom is estimated to be around 30.6 billion British pounds.102 These
include, but not limited to; its 15% stake in British Stock exchange, investments in Barclays
bank, where Qatar has a seven percent stake, investments in Canary Wharf where it has a twentyfour percent stake, investments in Harrods of which it now owns after purchasing the prestigious
mall for 1.5 billion British Pounds.103
Qatar also has substantial investments in other parts of Europe. Qatar has a 17% stake in
Volkswagen, a Germany based automotive company valued at 11 billion dollars, a 2.13% stake
in Royal Dutch Shell oil cooperation, and many more. In France, Qatar has invested over 15
billion dollars in various project and ventures, earning it a “preferential investor treatment,”
which exempts Qatar owned investment institutions from capital gain taxes on property in
France.104 Qatar also has considerable investments in Greece and Italy. Qatar has a 9.75
investment in Russian owned Rosneft, valued at 6.8 billion dollars.
According to the U.S. State Department, in recent years Qatar has begun to invest heavily
in the United States through its sovereign wealth fund and has opened an office in New York to
coordinate its investments.105 Qatar's investment in the United States has been on an increasing
trajectory, as it seeks to amend its ties with the U.S. government, which has been on a downward
spiral. This is due to Qatar's questionable activities and policies, which undermine its neighbors
and U.S. interest in the region. As Qatar's diplomatic rift with its Gulf neighbor's threatens its
security, Qatar has given investment in the U.S. more priority.
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Qatar has traditionally viewed its investment in the U.S. Al Udeid airbase as a strategic
bridge and extension of U.S. security. However, the U.S. critical stance on Qatar's support for
extremists, has strained this bilateral relationship with the U.S. This has prompted Qatar to invest
more directly in the U.S. homeland, as a way of improving its relationship with the U.S. This
economic move by Qatar coincides with the Economy laden “American first policy” of the
Donald Trump Administration, which has been a plus for Qatar.
In this light, the Chief Executive Officer of Qatar Investment Authority, Sheikh Abdullah
bin Mohamed bin Saud al-Thani, stated Qatar's plan to invest the remaining part of its forty-five
billion dollar U.S. investment capital in the infrastructure of the United States.106 This is in
addition to Qatar's substantial investments in U.S. markets, which include a broad array of
sectors. Qatar has more than a 10 percent stake in New York-based luxury jeweler, Tiffany &
Co, a 44-percent stake in the $8.6 billion redevelopment project in New York known as
Manhattan West, and a 9.9% stake in the iconic Empire State Building.107 It also has a majority
stake in the city project in Washington D.C, which has been described as Washington‟s biggest
project in two decades.108
Qatar has been a major importer of American weaponry and arms and has increased its
defense expenditures from United State defense corporations. In 2014, Qatar was the United
States largest customer for foreign military sales, purchasing more than $10 billion in advanced
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military equipment (Apache helicopters, Patriot missile defense, and Javelin missiles).109 Qatar
also purchased eight C-17s and four C-130Js via direct commercial sales.110
In 2017, Qatar signed a 12 billion dollar deal with the U.S. to buy F-15 fighter jets a deal
a Qatari official stated as "proof that U.S. institutions are with the U.S."111 Qatar views its
investment as a form of “relationship investing” to create a positive climate for deeper political
ties. Qatar intends to cultivate these relationships with countries that can be called friends in
times their political weight will be needed, as it has done in the current GCC crisis.
In this regard, it is no surprise that Qatar has increased its investments in the United
States, as part of an economic charm offensive to gain the trust of the U.S., especially after the
GCC crisis.112 From all indications, Qatar's economic move coupled with political lobbying has
been yielding some positive results, judging from recent statements made by U.S. policymakers.
Remarks made by the U.S. Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense at the inaugural U.S.Qatar Strategic Dialogue shows that Qatar is beginning to find itself in the good books of the
United States.
The U.S. Secretary of State in this summit described Qatar as a “longtime friend and
partner,” while U.S. Secretary of Defense praised Qatar for its “longstanding support of
America‟s present and continuing commitment to regional security.”113 In a meeting at the White
House, President Donald Trump praised Emir Tamim of Qatar, stating, "you've now become a
very big advocate (against terrorism) and we appreciate that." Going further, it became apparent
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that Qatar's “relationship investing” had a lot to do with the President's change of heart.
Especially, after he noted that Qatar “buys a lot of equipment from us, a lot of purchases in the
United States, and a lot of military airplanes, and missiles.” These statements are in stark contrast
to the harsh comments that were directed at Qatar in the wake of the GCC crisis, and shows how
Qatar uses investments to strategically achieve foreign-policy objectives.
Internally, Qatar has been able to transform itself from an obscure desert to a land of
exquisite and exotic buildings, with magical touches of artistry brilliance and art, coated with
luxury, fit for any royalty on earth. Qatar is constantly keeping pace with current and future
trends in real estate development, technology, transportation, sports, culture, and education, to
ensure Qatar's relevance as a global destination for travelers and tourists. These investments have
increased its profile internationally, making Qatar one of the most visited countries in the world
today.
Qatar investments in very conspicuous and flamboyant projects in its homeland also help
divert attention away from is controversial policies, which cast the small country in a bad light.
This may very well be the reason why Qatar has taken deep interest in hosting popular sporting
events, in tennis, golf, and, athletics.114 Qatar's successful bid to host the 2022 International
Federation of Association Football (FIFA) world cup, remains one of its most important
achievements in its branding efforts. This is because the world cup is the most watched sporting
event in the world. Qatar is also a very staunch investor in European football clubs, further
increasing its visibility.115 For Qatar, these investments help their influence and increase their
global presence worldwide.
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Sheikha Moza Bint Nasser, the wife of former Qatar emir, Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani,
is a spectacle of modernity, and a very conspicuous figure in Qatar's rebranding project. She
carries with her, a very plush air of Qatar's soft power and influence, through which Qatar
displays its attractiveness to the western world with Arabic characteristics. As the Chair of the
Qatar Foundation for Education Science and Community Development, she is the brainchild
behind many of Qatar's ventures in education, foreign aids, and investments.116
Sheikha Moza's effort in shaping Qatar as a modern state is patterned heavily to
accommodate western investments, especially in education. Qatar's educational city according to
its website caters to the “rising number of international and regional travelers drawn to Qatar.”117
It has seen an impressive flow of American educational institutions, such as Georgetown's
School of Foreign Service, Northwestern University, Cornell, Carnegie Mellon, Georgetown,
Texas A&M, and Virginia Commonwealth universities.118 These institutions add credibility to
Qatar's ambitions to carve a niche for itself as a progressive state.
Although Sheikha Mozah portrays the progressive values of the western world in her
initiatives, she also characterizes Qatar's contradictions in her policies. For Example, she chairs
the Arab Democracy Foundation, which aims to support the work of Arab civil society
organizations that promote democratization and citizen participation. 119 However, she is also a
key figure in Qatar's undemocratic system of government, with its poor human rights record for
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women and immigrant workers. In this sense, Sheikha Mozah is a symbol of the deep
ambiguities that render Qatar such a curious proposition.120

Mediation and Hyperactive Diplomacy
The tool of mediation is a special component of Qatar's strategic arsenal, used in
asymmetrically increasing its regional and international influence. Article 7 of Qatar's
constitution, states that its foreign policy “is based on the principle of strengthening international
peace and security, as a means of encouraging the peaceful resolution of international
disputes.”121 This plays in line with Qatar's overall objective to “carve out an image” for itself, an
image of a credible mediator and a peacemaker.122 (Although Qatar‟s adventurism since the days
of the Arab spring has dented its image as a credible mediator, it is unlikely that Qatar has
abandoned mediation as a foreign policy tool.)
Qatar's desire to mediate and act as an intermediary in regional conflicts has deep
traditional and religious roots. The Hakam, which invokes a figure of maturity and impartiality
as a mediator of disputes between tribes, is part of ancient Arab tradition and was a key part of
Prophet Mohamed's legacy.123 The Hakam in a dispute is usually associated with wisdom and
justice. Qatar desires to be seen amid conflicts and disputes, as a regional and international actor
with well-meaning intentions, capable of providing credible mediating efforts. For Qatar,
mediation and hyperactive diplomacy is a gateway to influence and stability, since mediating
states are usually accorded respect from the international community.
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Through diplomacy and mediation, Qatar has been active in several conflicts. This has
increased Qatar‟s standing and respect in the international community as a go to actor for
negotiations and dispute resolution. For instance, the United States has been known to “consult”
with Qatar on certain issues, due to Qatar's extensive contact with a wide range of actors of
significant importance, such as extremist movements and leaders.
Qatar sees mediation as a very intricate part of its foreign policy, intended to remove the
large shadow cast by larger neighbors such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt. In this regard, it is not
surprising that Saudi Arabia and Egypt have frowned at Qatar for some of its diplomatic
initiatives. For example, according to leaked U.S. diplomatic cables, a high-level Egyptian
diplomat in Doha claimed in 2010 “frankly, Egypt is angered by Qatar‟s mediation [in Darfur]
purely because it involves a country in Egypt‟s back yard.” This statement is a clear indication
that Qatar's leadership role is beginning to take strong roots in the Middle East.
Qatar, before to the Arab spring, had meticulously courted the image, and reputation of a
neutral party in disputes. This element of neutrality was a great booster for Qatar's credibility in
its mediation endeavors, regionally and internationally. Unlike the great powers on the global
stage or the regional powers like Saudi Arabia, the disputing parties always welcomed Qatar‟s
non-partisan position in international politics.
A classic example is Qatar's mediation effort in the 2008 Lebanon crisis, which remains
one of Qatar's greatest diplomatic achievements. The mediation process overseen by Qatar was
successful, because, the warring sides trusted Qatar's credibility, as opposed to other countries
that had offered to intervene in the crisis.124 The outcome of this effort resulted in the “Doha
accord.” Political pundits have noted that Qatar's status was further enhanced, as it succeeded
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when powerful countries failed. The Doha accord stands as a hallmark and emblem of Qatar's
diplomatic prowess and good neighborliness, which is what Qatar, intends to portray in its
international relations.
Qatar's mediation has certain peculiarities that stand out from the crowd of other small
states, which also engage in diplomatic efforts to increase their international standing, such as
Norway and Switzerland. One of which is Qatar's flair for visibility, attention, and the attraction
that comes with closely monitored and scrutinized regional or international disputes. A mediator
familiar with Qatar's diplomatic initiative stated that Qatar “often ends up placing more emphasis
on the „news‟ of mediation rather than the outcomes.”125 Qatar appreciates the goodwill that
comes from offering a lending hand to the international community, occupied by different
challenges, which serves as an impetus for its leadership to do more.
Qatar fully understands that the more mediation successes it records, the more Qatar is
able to further its reputation and standing internationally. Since 2005, Qatar‟s extensive
involvement in regional mediation, in countries such as Sudan, Lebanon, Yemen, Iraq, etc., has
led analysts to dub the country „the non-stop mediator.‟126 However, Qatar‟s role in the Arab
Spring and other Middle Eastern disputes has damaged its reputation as an impartial mediator.
Qatar decided to take sides with Islamist movements, based on its assumption that they will be
the foundation of political power in the Middle East. On the long run, this has proved false, and
Qatar has lost a great deal of the credibility it once enjoyed, in mediating between conflicting
parties, due to its neutrality.
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In fact, Qatar has come under heavy criticism for some of the groups it supports in its bid
to mediate. For instance, Qatar‟s hosting of Hamas leaders and its financial aid to the Gaza Strip,
has drawn criticism from the U.S., as support for a terrorist organization.127 Although, Qatar says
it only supports the humanitarian needs of the Palestinian people, nevertheless, Hamas violent
positions on a range of issues are deemed too extreme to support in any way. Despite the fact,
that Qatar's back-channel access, and mediation were initially its unique selling points, its
adventurism has caused widespread regional and international irritation, making Qatar a victim
of its own success.128
Another critical aspect of Qatar‟s mediation efforts, are the huge sums of money the
Qatari government occasionally pays to terrorist organizations as ransoms for hostages. It is
reported, that Qatar paid as much as a billion dollars to former al-Qaeda affiliate in Syria, and to
Iranian security officials to secure the release of members of the Qatari royal family.129 Qatar has
also facilitated the release of citizens of other countries from terrorist organizations, by paying
tens of millions of dollars as ransoms on behalf of their government.130
In a congressional testimony to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, David Andrew
Weinberg stated, that Qatar‟s “reckless enthusiasm” for paying ransoms in its negotiations is part
of “Doha‟s broader efforts to turn money and extremist connections into political power, even if
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doing so inevitably results in the strengthening of violent extremists who act in the service of alQaeda.”131

Strategic Defense and Security Alliances
Qatar's capacity to build a military force sufficient to meet its strategic security requirements is
virtually non-existent. As stated above, Qatar has one of the smallest population sizes in the
Persian Gulf.132 Unlike many of its regional counterparts such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and
Kuwait, Qatar does not have a credible military force of its own. This fact has long featured in
the security calculus of Qatari leaders for decades. For this reason, Qatar actively seeks out
alliances and partnerships that promise both political and territorial security assurances from
adversaries.
Qatar's international relations with dominant foreign powers are strategic and deliberate.
For Qatar, international relations are not just political relationships, but multi-faceted tools in
achieving its national interest especially its security. This approach to international relations, for
security benefits, has been a central part of Qatar's international interactions with foreign powers
for decades. Security was, in fact, the dominant strategic reason for which Qatar and the British
Empire interacted before it gained its independence in 1971. The British Empire protected Qatar
from the expansionist and the dominant foreign policies of actors such as Saudi Arabia and
Bahrain.
Qatar's emergence as an influential player in regional and global politics has particularly
increased its need for security. Especially, since the regime of Sheikh Hamad bin Al-Thani,
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whose grand vision for Qatar regionally, and internationally brought the small state to
prominence. Qatar has pursued foreign policies that have traditionally been outside the forte of
“small powers.” In an international setting where small states are expected to roam within the
sphere of influence of larger powers; Qatar has actively sought to define and create its circle of
operations. Such steps have caused negative reactions from Qatar‟s neighbors, which view
Qatar‟s actions as threats to their geopolitical ambitions. In this regard, Qatar‟s strategic
partnerships are a shield, by which Qatar can asymmetrically protect itself from the threats that
come with its oversized role.
The first Gulf War brought to the fore, the vulnerability of small states like Qatar in the
Persian Gulf region, with no significant defense apparatus and posture, to deter or pose
significant damage or cost to a determined adversary. Iraq‟s invasion of Kuwait accentuated
Qatar's need for a security ally to deter potential adversaries, especially, after the absence of the
British security umbrella it once enjoyed. In this light, Qatar has sought and maintained a close
relationship with the United States to boost its security on a strategic level. Following the end of
the Gulf War, Qatar and the U.S. signed a defense cooperation agreement in June 1992, which
permitted U.S. access to bases, propositioning of U.S. material, and joint U.S. military
exercises.133
This relationship, between the U.S. and Qatar, is proof of Qatar's ability to intersect itself
with the strategic interest of the dominant powers. Qatar is adept at understanding international
trends, and like sea-waves rides them to its interest. Although U.S.-Qatar relationship began to
take deep roots after the signing of the 1972 defense alliance agreement, Qatar's willingness to
collaborate with the U.S. in the famous “war against terror” deepened this relationship. Qatar

133

Looney, Robert. Handbook of U.S.-Middle East Relations. Routledge, 22 May 2014, Google Books,
books.google.com/books/about/Handbook_of_US_Middle_East_Relations.html?id=yFqhAwAAQBAJ

48

followed the international “anti-terror wave” with keen interest. Qatar did not only court the
United States, but it also financed the U.S. Al-Udeid base on its soil to the tune of one billion
dollars, making it the largest U.S. base in the region.134
The Al-Udeid base houses the forward headquarters of the U.S. Air Force Central
Command Combined Air, and Space Operations Center, and the 379th Air Expedition Wing.135 It
has been a prominent feature in the ongoing counter-terrorism operations in the Middle East,
with some experts stating that some U.S. capabilities in the Al-Udeid base will be difficult to
relocate quickly to another destination.136 The constant upgrade the base enjoys, with Qatar's
significant approval and contribution, is vital to understanding the role the base plays in Qatar's
national security policy.
Qatar views the base as an anchor for its security. It is more than an airbase to Qatar, in
its strategic calculus; the base is a deterrent against adversaries and potential invaders. Qatar
willingness to have U.S. troops and allies on its soil is a major factor that makes the small state
of Qatar “strategic” to the U.S. militarily. Qatar has gone and continues to go to great lengths to
ensure that U.S. presence in its territory is entrenched as much as possible. Even to the point of
allowing the sale of alcohol in U.S. military bases, which is unusual for a country that brands
itself as a follower of the Wahhabi version of Islam. In fact, in 1999, Qatar's former emir, Sheikh
Hamad, reportedly told U.S. officials that he would like to see as many as 10,000 U.S.
servicemen permanently stationed at Al Udeid. 137
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Qatar also has a defense partnership with Turkey through a defense partnership
agreement signed in 2016. The defense agreement provides for Turkey's installation of a military
base in Qatar, and joint military drills aimed at improving Qatar's army and boosting military
cooperation.138 France and Britain also maintain a substantial military presence in Qatar. Aside
from hosting foreign troops on its soil, Qatar is a major buyer of defense and military hardware
and capabilities, which Qatar uses to curry favors from countries it seeks to partner with.
In light of the current Gulf Cooperation Council crisis, Qatar's foreign minister has made
it clear, that in the event Qatar faces military aggression it “has enough friends in order to stop
them...”139 These friends are undoubtedly, the well cultivated and courted allies of Qatar, which
continue to benefit one way or the other from Qatar's strategic benefits. As soon as the GCC
crisis started amid unprecedented diplomatic and economic isolation of Qatar, Turkey
immediately sent foodstuffs to Qatar and fast-tracked a legislation to increase its military
presence there.140 Even Iran, whom Qatar would not take a hard stance on, compensated Qatar by
sending food and fruits. The U.S. Department of Defense also lent Qatar a goodwill message as a
sign of solidarity, despite contrary messages from its Commander in Chief.141 This goes a long
way to demonstrate how Qatar can strategically intersect itself with dominant powers, in ways
that make it difficult for these states to ignore Qatar‟s value to them.
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THE DIVERSE INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE MIDDLE EAST

It is pertinent to understand the interest of the United States in the Middle East, to be able
to comprehend how Qatar's foreign policies and the tools used in achieving them, affect or
undermine the geopolitical position and objective of the United States. The Middle East is of
strategic value to the United States and remains so until this day. The United States has vital
geopolitical, economic, and security interests in the Middle East, and as such, it is always in the
interest of the United States to maintain a coherent policy and posture to realize its objectives.
The interests of the United States in the Middle East are as follows:

The Political Stability and Security of its Allies
The political stability of the Middle East region is of strategic benefit to the United States
and its interests. The U.S. has a long political history with the Middle East and began deepening
its involvement in the region after the start of the cold war. This was because it became
imperative for the United States within the context of the cold war to defend and expand its
geopolitical sphere of influence in the region. President Dwight Eisenhower once described the
Middle East as the “most strategically important area in the world.”142 Although, the cold war is
over and the United States remains the world's only superpower, the Middle East as a
geopolitical zone, still looms large in the strategic calculus of the United States.
As the primary security guarantor and partner of many Middle Eastern countries, the
United States has a strong interest in the region. In this light, despite the ambivalence of U.S.
policymakers about U.S. involvement in the Middle East, U.S. interests in the region are still
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significant, and the prospect that Middle Eastern troubles will impact America if left unattended
is as high as ever.143 It is thus, in the interest of the United States, to maintain a substantive level
of influence and power projection capabilities, coupled with right foreign policies to achieve its
objectives.
The impact of history in Middle Eastern affairs, worldview, and international relations
cannot be overstated, and it is displayed in the peculiar nature of challenges that face the region.
The Middle East experiences relentless wars, disputes, and conflicts making it one of the most
volatile regions in the world. These conflicts and disputes are so intricate and volatile that wars,
for the most part, lurk just a few miscalculations away.
The regional order of the Middle East is very fragile, and can easily give way to chaos
and crisis that can threaten the international system in a myriad of ways, and most importantly,
threaten U.S. interest. A very glaring example is the 1973 oil crisis that caused shock waves
throughout the U.S. economy. This crisis was due to U.S. decision to support Israel in its war
against Egypt and Syria, leading to Arab countries imposing an oil embargo on the U.S. and
some allied Western nations. The impact of the crisis on the world economy and the United
States was quite profound. Especially, after the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OAPEC) joined by Syria, Egypt and Tunisia, imposed a total embargo on shipments
of oil to the United States and selectively curbed exports to other consumers in Western Europe
and Japan.144
The price shock of 1973 is reported to have shrunk the U.S. economy by approximately
2.5 percent, increased unemployment and inflation, and spun the economy into a severe and
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extended recession (1973–1975).145 The 1973 oil crisis has been referred to as the most severe
financial depression after the great depression.146
In this same way, the Iranian revolution of 1979 also had a great effect on the interest of
the United States, politically and economically. The Iranian revolution put great stress on the
American people psychologically, because, of the hostage crisis, which lasted for 444 days.147
The invasion of Kuwait by Iraq's Saddam Hussein is another typical example of the importance
of the Middle Eastern region to the United States, and its interest. As explained by then President
H.W Bush, “Our jobs, our way of life, our own freedom, and the freedom of friendly countries
around the world would all suffer if control of the world's great oil reserves fell into the hands of
Saddam Hussein.”148
Failure to have acted swiftly in ousting Saddam Hussein from Kuwait could have
impacted negatively on the U.S. and the world economy. This was because Saddam Hussein's
occupation of Kuwait would have left him with a substantial amount of the world‟s oil reserves,
giving him the power to dictate oil prices, creating economic panic and chaos worldwide.
However, despite a resounding and impressive victory over Iraq, the war set off an economic
recession caused in part by a spike in oil prices.149
The examples above are indications of the need for the United States to ensure the
geopolitical stability of the Middle East and friendly regimes. The importance of U.S. Middle
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Eastern allies and partners, in the economic, security, and other vital sectors of the United States
is evident. These strategic partnerships contribute to U.S. prosperity and safety. The interest of
the United States in the Middle East is best secured in a strategic environment of peace and
political stability. The U.S. thus, makes it a point of duty to ensure the political climate of the
Middle East is favorable to its interests.
The political coloration of the Middle East has taken on a very distinct tone since the
Arab spring. The Arab spring began a new chapter in the geopolitical dynamics of the Middle
East, leaving it more vulnerable to conflicts, and wars than almost any other time in its history.
The wave of revolutions that has swept the Middle East has changed the political landscape, with
longtime autocrats gone, and some new regimes put in place.
With this chaotic landscape, political instability permeates the region at unseen levels,
leading to many failed states devoid of any semblance of government and order, especially with
the outbreak of civil wars and conflicts in countries like Syria and Yemen. The geopolitical
significance of these conflicts to the United States stems from U.S. involvement with some of
these conflicts, along with its snowballing, and domino effect that characterizes conflicts in the
Middle East. This spillover of disputes and conflict create uncertainties and increase
unpredictability, which can lead to more conflict if not properly managed.
In this light, Iran plays a particularly adversarial role in the Middle East, as Iran's
expansionist policy creates fear and discontent among allies, who rely on U.S. leadership to deter
Iranian influence in the region. According to the U.S. National Security Strategy, “Iran continues
to sow violence and remains the most significant challenge to Middle East stability.”150 In recent
times, Iran has again shown its penchant for acting as a destabilizing force against U.S. interest
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in the Middle East, by threatening the freedom of navigation on the strategic Strait of Hormuz, in
response to U.S. sanctions.151
Iran's role in the Yemeni civil war has exacerbated the conflict with its backing of Houthi
rebels, who fight against the internationally recognized regime of President Abd-Rabbu Mansour
Hadi. 152 Iran‟s support for the brutal and autocratic government of Assad in Syria also goes
against the objectives of U.S. policymakers in the region. As noted by the National Defense
Strategy, “Iran is asserting an arc of influence and instability” which challenges U.S. goals in the
Middle East.153

Counter Terrorism and Security
Countering-terrorism in the Middle East is of strategic importance to the United States,
and a source of significant concern for U.S. strategic thinkers and policymakers. The 9/11 attacks
on the United States by Al Qaeda, brought to the fore the strategic importance of the Middle East
region in the security orbit of the United States. Before the 9/11 attacks, the United States had
been subject to several terrorist attacks. One of such attacks was in Yemen, when Al Qaeda
attacked the USS Cole in the port of Aden with a boat filled with explosives, killing 17 American
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sailors.154 Also included is the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center, which killed six people
and injured over a thousand, which was also perpetrated by al Qaeda.155
The 9/11 attacks demonstrated the changing security landscape, caused by the growing
inter-connectedness of the world due to globalization. It used to be that the United States had for
years derived its sense of security from its unique geographical position, bordered by the sea, and
its notable influence over its neighbors. The global landscape has changed, with the improvement
of technology, communication, and transportation. Terrorists seek to take advantage of these
changes to further their destructive goals, such as spreading propaganda through social media,
and the potential use of offensive cyber capabilities against target countries.156
As terrorist organizations seek to increase the lethality of their attacks, they have
alarmingly turned to the acquisition of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). The spread of
nuclear weapon technology and advanced manufacturing technology remains a persistent
problem, while recent advances in bioengineering raise another concern, increasing the potential,
variety, and ease of access to biological weapons.157 Terrorist organizations such as the Islamic
State have been reported to use chemical weapons in Syria.158 Thus, raising concerns of the
possibility that a terrorist organization with WMD capability would seek to use it against the
U.S., if they could.
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Terrorist organizations that operate in the Middle East, such as Al-Qaeda, Al-Nusra, and
The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS), are still major threats to the U.S. ISIS in
particular mirrors the modern face of terrorism, with its diverse pool of young talents which are
able to harness technology to further their agenda. In this regard, ISIS as an organization has
been able to make extensive use of technology to carry out operations and logistics which
increase their reach and lethality. For example, through the use of social media, ISIS has been
able to recruit individuals and spread its propaganda, at levels not seen before from a terrorist
organization. The Islamic state is also reported to have employed drones in Syria, as tools for
surveillance, and reconnaissance.159 Although the territorial gains of the Islamic State have been
largely reduced, ISIS as well as other terrorist organizations like Al-Qaeda, are still dangerous to
the United States.
The continuous presence of wars and conflicts in the Middle East region has created quite
a number of failed or weak states. These conflicts and wars are largely due to geopolitical tussles
between regional powers, such as Iran and Saudi Arabia in Yemen. In Syria, foreign powers such
as, Iran, Russia, U.S.A, and Turkey have diverse interests, which have directly or indirectly
contributed to the Syrian war.160 These wars and conflicts have created the fertile ground for the
breeding of terrorism, and violent extreme organizations. Thus, terrorist groups fill the political
and administrative void in many parts of the region, which offer various alternative structures for
governance.
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This poses a threat to the United States, as terrorist organizations such as ISIS and AlQaeda are determined to destroy the United States.161 In this light, a terrorist organization that is
allowed the laxity to function as a government will most likely allow its territory to be a staging
ground for terrorist‟s attacks. It was this scenario that enabled Al Qaeda to carry out the 9/11
attacks on the United States from Afghanistan, as the Taliban government permitted Afghanistan
to be used by them.
Islamist organizations such as Hamas and the Taliban seek to entrench themselves into
the political fabric of state institutions. Hamas, which has been designated as a terrorist
organization by the United States, has been very active in the administrative and governmental
structure of the Palestinians in the West Bank.162 Although the Palestine people elected Hamas in
a democratic process, this group is a destabilizing factor to the security of Israel, which is a U.S.
ally. The same goes for Hezbollah, the so-called “party of God.” Hezbollah functions as a
legitimate party in Lebanon; however, it has been a powerful asymmetric tool, in the arsenal of
Iran for unleashing mayhem against Iran‟s enemies, especially Israel, whom it has fought a major
war with.163
Terrorism in the Middle East has taken a particularly ugly turn, as proxy wars in the
region have become fiercer, and some states are beginning to throw caution to the wind by
sponsoring known terrorist groups to score geopolitical gains. These actions hamper U.S. efforts
to fight terrorism and promote instability. The continuous funding of terrorist organizations poses
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a threat to the homeland in the long run. In this light, the United States has a vital and significant
interest in stopping funding for terrorist organizations.164

The Stability and Security of Israel
Israel and the United States of America have a strategic relationship, which has lasted for
decades, going back to World War Two.165 These two nations share deeply valued ideals and
fundamental beliefs in democracy, and the rule of law. These make Israel particularly valuable to
the United States, as the only viable and working democracy in the Middle East. Israel is thus
expected to be a strategic buffer and a democratic ally in a region that is saturated with autocratic
and dictatorial regimes. Israel as a strategic ally has extensive military, technological, and
intelligence cooperation with the United States, which helps the U.S. in navigating the
complexities of the Middle East.166
Israel serves as a valuable partner for U.S. security interest in the Middle East and has
taken on security missions that would have been politically, and militarily difficult for the United
States. For example, Israel‟s bombing of Iraq's and Syria's nuclear facility in 1981 and 2007
respectively, would have presented the U.S. with political problems, if it was to be carried out by
U.S. forces. However, Israel was able to succeed in destroying the targets which could have had
wide-reaching implications for the U.S., had these countries been able to develop nuclear
weapons. Noteworthy, is Israel's contribution to U.S. counter-terrorism efforts in the Middle
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East, as its insights and knowledge about the Middle East are unparalleled, and its reach in the
region is unmatched.167
In this light, the political, economic, and security stability of Israel is of vital importance
to the United States, due to its strategic gains and benefits. The United States and Israel share
similar perspectives on security threats to their homelands and citizens, which itself has become
a cementing factor in their relationship. One of such threats is the Islamic Republic of Iran. Iran
has been described by some analysts as an obstacle to America's leadership and interest in the
region. A view shared by General Joseph Votel, commander of the U.S. Central Command, who
stated in a congressional hearing that Iran plays a “destabilizing role” in the region. 168 Iran's
disdain for the U.S. is well known, and there is no greater buffer against Iran and its activities
than the state of Israel. Israel's role in helping the U.S. contain Iran is highly valuable and has led
to outstanding results in the realm of intelligence, and counter-terrorism efforts relating to Iran.
Iran, as a threat to the state of Israel, has sometimes been described as existential in scale,
given Iran's determination to destroy Israel. Iran is a state supporter and sponsor of terrorism and
uses different terrorist groups to harm the interest of the United States and Israel. As the primary
benefactor of terrorist groups such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, Iran can extend its sphere of
influence right to the borders of Israel. The dangers of which can be seen in the 2006 IsraeliLebanon war, with the extensive use of Iranian made and supplied advanced weapons, armories,
and gears by Hezbollah.169 Due to the training that members of Hezbollah were exposed to by
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Iranian military officials, it is been reported that the level of competence and effectiveness of
Hezbollah in that war came as a surprise to the Israeli's.170
This is an evidence of the danger Iran poses to Israel's security, and from media reports,
Iran has been sending lots of missiles to Hezbollah, apparently in anticipation of another Israeli
war.171 Such activities expose Israel to attack from Hezbollah and destabilize other allies in the
region. Iran is also a staunch supporter of Hamas, which has been responsible for the deaths and
destruction of many Israeli lives and properties. Iran has been supplying arms and missiles to
Hamas, knowing full well that such missiles will be used against Israel in times of conflicts. 172
Iran's willingness to attack and provoke Israel is made bare by the writings on its missiles. Iran
missiles are usually launched with the inscriptions “death to Israel” inscribed on the exterior.
As the U.S. seeks to protect these interests, it is pertinent to know how Qatar‟s actions
help or harm them. These various interests of the United States are affected in numerous ways, as
Qatar conducts its foreign policies using its asymmetric tools. Qatar‟s actions have sometimes
harmed these interests, like Qatar‟s support for Hamas, which undermines U.S. counter-terrorism
effort and Israel stability. In this light, these interests of the United States are key to
understanding its calculus in its relationship with Qatar, and how it should respond to them.
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IMPLICATIONS OF QATAR'S ASYMMETRIC TOOLS AND FOREIGN POLICY
ON U.S. INTERESTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Qatar's Policy of Strategic Hedging Supports Islamist Movements that Destabilize the
Middle East and U.S. Allies in the Region
Qatar is partly responsible for the vast majority of the regional decadence that has
occurred in the Middle East since the Arab revolution. In Qatar's calculus, Islamist organizations
would evolve to become the main players in the governmental structures of the Middle East. This
election of Islamist parties into power through democratic means further strengthened this
assumption.173
In order to ensure that the new geopolitical climate of the Middle East will be favorable
to Qatar, Qatar began supporting Islamist movements generally and the Muslim Brotherhood
particularly. As noted in the section on strategic hedging, Qatar's foreign policy during this time
was to hedge its bet on the potential for Islamist movements to reshape the power structure of the
region. In this light, Qatar viewed Islamist movements as potential allies and sought to align with
them.
However, Qatar's actions have proved to be detrimental to U.S. interest for political
stability in the region today. Many of the Islamist groups that Qatar gambled on, due to their
popularity among citizens have turned out to be destabilizing forces in the region. In Syria, Qatar
as an ally of the U.S., along with other Gulf allies such as Saudi Arabia, support moderate groups
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backed by the United States.174 However, Qatar is also reported to be simultaneously supporting
groups outside of U.S. designated factions, in the ongoing civil war. This has led to a very
haphazard approach to the Syrian crisis. Many of these groups are reported to have strong links
with al Qaeda, and the Islamic State.175
In Libya also, Qatar's haphazard support for rebels, irrespective of the nature or
affiliations of these groups with terrorism and extremism, has contributed to the degradation of
Libya's political stability. For instance, Qatar backed Islamist militia commanders, such as
Abdelhakim Belhadj, who was once the head of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, an Al-Qaeda
affiliate group sanctioned by both the United States and the United Nations.176
Furthermore, while the United States and its partners tried to promote the Transitional
National Council (TNC) as the legitimate government of Libya, Qatar repeatedly and unhelpfully
pushed for a more prominent role for alternative opposition groups that were dependent on
Qatar.177 Many of these groups as reported were extremist, which intended to further their
terroristic agenda using Libya as a base. This made it extremely difficult for the U.S. to
implement its plan for state building in Libya after U.S.-NATO overthrow of Qaddafi left the
country in shambles.178 This is because; many of these extremists acquired the resources to
struggle for power with the Transitional National Council, creating chaos and anarchy in the
country.179
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Qatar's support for the Muslim Brotherhood particularly threatens the political stability of
crucial U.S. allies in the region, such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Although,
the actions of the Muslim Brotherhood vary from country to country, it rationalizes attacks
against American forces and interests, rejects the very concept of peace with Israel, and promotes
religious intolerance.180 If the Muslim Brotherhood becomes the dominant power in the Middle
East, America's ability to maintain a strong presence in the region could be eroded. However,
allies like Kuwait and Jordan allow members of the Muslim Brotherhood participate in their
governments. Nonetheless, Qatar's support for the Muslim Brotherhood differs from that of
Kuwait and Jordan. Qatar intends to promote political Islam as the regional order of the Middle
East, which can challenge the political stability of allies like Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain.

Al Jazeera’s Message Counters U.S. Influence in the Region and Threatens U.S. Allies in
the Middle East
As noted above, Qatar's Al Jazeera news network has been a very dynamic and potent
force in setting the agenda of a large population of the Middle East. Al Jazeera Arabic is by far
the most popular and most watched network in the Middle East, and it is very effective in
shaping regional outcomes.181 Under “normal” circumstances, as an ally of the United States,
Qatar's impressive reach through Al Jazeera could translate to good gains for the U.S., in its
attempt to win over the hearts and minds of the Arab world. However, this has not been the case.
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As noted above, Al Jazeera is a tool in the hands of the Qatari government and its activities as a
media powerhouse, have in many cases affected the interest of the United States negatively.
Al Jazeera has often hampered the geopolitical interests of the U.S., making it difficult
for the U.S. to achieve key geopolitical objectives. For instance, due to Al Jazeera‟s sensational
reporting during the second intifada, Egypt found it increasingly difficult to remain moderate.182
Finally, Hosni Mubarak recalled the ambassador to Israel, stating, “I had to do something.”183
Al Jazeera‟s actions have also caused a geopolitical turmoil in the GCC, due to its critical
reporting of U.S. allies, such as Saudi Arabia, and the UAE despite banning such for its own
government comes to the fore with the ongoing GCC crisis. These activities by Al Jazeera have
further put a strain on the GCC, fracturing an important political bloc. In this light, the State
Department in its 2017 “Country Report on terrorism” noted that the “Gulf dispute that broke out
in June froze most GCC-wide engagements.”184 This break down in GCC relations might affect
U.S. strategies to contain Iran‟s activities in the region, as well as maintain geopolitical order in
the Middle East.
Al Jazeera‟s message as noted above, is a staple outlet for anti-Semitism. Al Jazeera‟s
programs especially on its Arabic channels continue to fuel anti-Semitic conspiracy theories. Al
Jazeera‟s anti-Semitism seems to have inspired one of the London Bridge bombers, Youssef
Zaghba in 2017. His mother and sister according to The Times, stated, Al Jazeera as a source for
his radicalization.185 To reiterate this point, Ayoob Kara former Israeli communications minister,
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called Al Jazeera a network that supports terrorism and supports religious radicalization, due to
its scathing and sensational coverage of Israel.186
He has also issued fatwas supporting suicide bombings against Israeli's, and Americans in
Iraq. He is widely credited for an upsurge in suicide bombings, due to his vast influence in the
Arab world. Al-Jazeera‟s reporting on Israel has been consistently egregious. Even among other
spates of Palestinian unrest in recent years, Al-Jazeera has remained a strident proponent of the
Palestinian cause, tacitly endorsing knife and vehicular attacks, or other acts of violence.

Qatar Using USA Military Presence as a Security Cover to Undermine the USA and its
Allies
Qatar hosts the forward operating base of the U.S. Central Command, Air Force 379th
Air Expeditionary Wing, the forward operating headquarters of U.S. Special Operations Central
Command (SOCCENT), and U.S. Air Forces Central Command (AFCENT).187 Apart from being
the largest U.S. base in the region, the base is equipped with two runways, which can
accommodate any airplane in the U.S. inventory.188 In this light, this base is of immense value to
the United States, and it has served as the preeminent base for launching attacks against terrorist
targets in the region.
Qatar uses this base as a way of intersecting itself into the security interest of the U.S.
Qatar has learned overtime in its international relations, to position itself with the interest of
great powers to be valuable to them. It has been an occurring theme in Qatar's history, and it is
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still a very potent policy tool for Qatar. This is also the logical sequence at play in regards to the
U.S. military presence in Qatar.
Qatar believes as long as it hosts the U.S. airbase, its value will outweigh the fall out of
its contradictory policies that anger its neighbors and the United States. This base is thus,
strategic to Qatar in the pursuit of its maverick foreign policies, which requires considerable
security assets to achieve. Qatar uses the base as a cover to shield itself from the possible
backlash that can arise as a result of its foreign policies. In this light, Qatar is definitely of the
strategic mindset that the U.S. military base is an assurance that the United States will support it
as a valuable ally, irrespective of what it does and its consequences.
This calculus, also explains why Qatar feels little or no pressure to follow the position of
its GCC allies. For example, while the United States and its Gulf allies have a shared objective
of shrinking the influence of Iran in the region, Qatar has sometimes been the weak link in
fulfilling that objective. Although this is partly due to its economic relationship with Iran, Qatar
nevertheless, seeks to benefit from the security assurance provided by America, while still
maintaining friendly relations with Iran.
This is not to suggest that as an ally of the U.S., Qatar is bound to always posture itself
aggressively towards Iran, however, oftentimes Qatar has proved willing to undermine the U.S.,
and its allies to please Iran. For instance, Qatar was the only state to have voted against a UN
resolution calling for Iran to stop its nuclear enrichment, much to the surprise of the United
States and the Gulf allies.189 In addition, just recently, Qatar‟s Foreign minister criticized a
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Mecca summit for been too hardline against Iran, and stated that Washington‟s policy toward
Iran did not take the geopolitical realities of the Middle East in consideration. 190
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UNDERSTANDING THE GULF COOPERATION CRISIS AND THE IMPACT OF U.S.
FOREIGN POLICY

The 2017 Gulf Cooperation Council crisis is an aggregate of Qatar's numerous missteps,
because of its foreign policies and the tools used in achieving them. It is a diplomatic crisis that
has seen Qatar politically, diplomatically, and economically isolated by half the members of the
Gulf Cooperation Council, along with Egypt.191 These GCC members are Saudi Arabia, Bahrain,
and the United Arab Emirates. This crisis is significant, due to the scale of isolation Qatar has
been subjected to, which analyst have called unprecedented in the history of the GCC.192
Saudi Arabia has closed its borders to Qatar, which happens to be Qatar's only land
border. In Addition to the land blockade, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, and
Egypt have also imposed an air blockade on Qatar, preventing Qatar from using their airspace, as
well as a sea blockade, thus, disrupting Qatar's trade and transportation sector.193 To further drive
home their point, these states have expelled Qatari citizens, and have been told to leave
irrespective of the fact they might have family members in these states. 194 The many sins of
Qatar given by the aggrieved countries are Qatar's alleged support for terrorism, its relationship
with Iran, and Al Jazeera's critical reporting on the Gulf Monarchies and their internal affairs.195
Qatar has long been a geopolitical challenge for many of its allies in the region. The
eagerness to punish Qatar can be seen with the instant and coordinated effort of the Gulf States in
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isolating Qatar, in the wake of allegations that the Qatari Emir made incendiary and critical
remarks at a speech against the United States, and had offered support for Iran, and backing to
Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood. 196 The Emir was presented with a joint list of thirteen
demands by the blockading states led by Saudi Arabia, which was later changed to Qatar
committing to six broad "principles," as a condition for diplomatic and political normalization.
197

These principles include:
1. Commitment to combat extremism and terrorism in all its forms and to prevent their
financing or the provision of safe havens,
2. Prohibiting all acts of incitement and all forms of expression which spread, incite,
promote or justify hatred and violence,
3. Full commitment to the 2013 Riyadh Agreement, and the supplementary agreement
and its executive mechanism for 2014 within the framework of the Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC) for Arab States,
4. Commitment to all the outcomes of the Arab-Islamic-U. S Summit held in Riyadh in
May 2017,
5. To refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of States and from supporting illegal
entities,
6. The responsibility of all states of the international community to confront all forms of
extremism and terrorism as a threat to international peace and security.198

From these demands, it is clear that there is a general discontent in regards to Qatar's
international relations and policies, which the United States and its Gulf allies see as a major
deviation from the regional order and collective interest.
Noteworthy is the fact that the 2017 Gulf Cooperation Crisis is not the first crisis to hit
the regional bloc. The “Qatar problem” has long been a thorn in the flesh of GCC members,
especially Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates. In 2014 Saudi Arabia along
196

Milton-Edwards, Beverly “GCC crisis: How to Resolve the Diplomatic Rift.” Brookings, Brookings Institution, 15
June 2017, ww.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2017/06/15/gcc-crisis-how-to-resolve-the-diplomatic-rift/
197
Khan, Tamuir. “Arab Countries' Six Principles for Qatar A Measure to Restart the Negotiation Process.” The
National, 19 July 2017, www.thenational.ae/world/gcc/arab-countries-six-principles-for-Qatar-a-measure-to-restartthe-negotiation-process-1.610314
198
Ibid

70

with the UAE, and Bahrain withdrew their ambassadors from Doha, accusing Qatar of
continuous support for terrorism, and meddling in their internal affairs.199 The crisis lasted for
about eight months, from March 2014 to November 2014, and was the first significant crisis to
rock the GCC.

Events Leading to the 2017 Gulf Cooperation Crisis
Although, the immediate cause of the 2017 GCC crisis is ostensibly due to an alleged
speech attributed to the emir of Qatar, which angered Saudi Arabia and its allies, however, the
underlying causes are deeper.200 Understanding the events leading to the first crisis in 2014 is key
to comprehending the present GCC crisis, along with the different regional and political
positions taken by each actor involved.
The 2014 GCC crisis was an eight-month diplomatic rift, which saw the withdrawal of
the ambassadors of Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Bahrain from Qatar. The crisis started in the wake of
the Arab Spring, which was uprooting regimes, and governments with such revolutionary force.
Qatar followed the new trend, and supported this change wholeheartedly, much to the anger of its
GCC allies.201 However, there is a deeper connotation to Qatar's support of the Arab Spring,
which has to do with Qatar's political history and interactions with its neighbors.
The ousting of Sheikh Khalifa Bin Hamad Al-Thani by his son, the former Emir of Qatar,
Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani in a 1995 bloodless coup, marked a drastic change in the
political climate of the country. (This has been explained in the chapter on the geopolitical
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history of Qatar.) However, one key component of this stage in Qatar's political development was
its unrelenting desire to carry out its individualistic foreign policies. Qatar, no longer wanting to
be seen as an appendage of Saudi Arabia, expressed its desire to be “known and be noticed”202
With this change, came a trend of systematic hostility against Qatar, and its leadership
from Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the UAE, which were of the view that by deposing Sheikh
Khalifa, Doha failed to respect the Gulf values, and traditions.203 To Qatar's disgust, the United
Arab Emirates offered the deposed Emir safe haven to establish a “temporary quarters,” after he
had reiterated his desire in various visits to Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt to regain back his
throne.204 These strings of meetings eventually lead to a series of counter-coups, reportedly
sponsored by some of the Gulf States to reinstate his father.205 Qatar responded by arresting the
supposed coup plotters and was of the view that its neighbors were after its political stability.
This incidence, coupled with historical grievances against its neighbors spurred Qatar to
challenge the Saudi dominated geopolitical order of the Middle East, which Qatar felt was unfair
to it. Marc Lynch, a political scientist at George Washington University, observed that since the
90s, “Qatari foreign policy is a combination of: „What can we do to get ourselves on the map?‟
and „What can we do to annoy the Saudis?”206 The Arab Spring thus presented Qatar with the
opportunity to influence the geopolitics of the Middle East, in a way that could achieve these
objectives. These included supporting regimes, and movements that were contrary to the political
interest of states Qatar deemed “problematic” geo-politically, first of which was Saudi Arabia.
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The first GCC crisis brought to the fore, the inherent mistrust, and suspicion hovering
over Qatar and its political relationships. Issues such as Qatar's support for Islamist's strikes a
chord at the heart of GCC states like Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, which
sincerely believe that Qatar has a cynical plan to undermine them. A belief fueled by Qatar's
nonstop romance with actors that seek to do so.207 The current GCC crisis, which started in 2017,
is a continuation of the unfinished business of 2014. Although, the 2014 GCC crisis ended with
the signing of a “Riyadh agreement,” the crisis was not necessarily resolved.

Understanding the Role of America's Foreign-Policy in the GCC Crisis
The 2017 GCC crisis unlike that of 2014 has a different dimension, which adds an
uncertain geopolitical element to the crisis. The crisis is coming in the wake of a radical change
in U.S. approach to foreign policy, as a result of the election of a new administration. The
escalation of the 2017 GCC crisis, can be somewhat attributed to this change in U.S. policy
spearheaded by President Trump. As noted by the Congressional Research Service, President
Trump‟s visit to Saudi Arabia, for the 2017 Riyadh summit in May 2017, caused passed
“differences” to be “erupted again.”208 Prior to this current administration, the United States had
been cautious on issues regarding the Middle East, and its Gulf allies, but such caution has not
been the case with the current United States administration, under President Donald J. Trump,
which pursues a distinct “America First” policy.
This policy, as advocated for by President Trump, carries with it, an inherent mistrust for
multilateral and inter-governmental organizations or agreements, that restrict the individual
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ability of the United States to carry out policies it deems fit for its interest. The interest of the
United States in the Middle East has fundamentally stayed the same. However, U.S. foreign
policy in achieving these objectives under the America-First strategy has circumvented the
traditional routes conventionally favored by past U.S. governments. For instance, the United
States unilaterally recognized Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, moving drastically away from
the decisions of past U.S. administrations to handle the Israel-Palestine state dispute
multilaterally by involving major stakeholders in the conflict.209
The United States has chosen to accomplish its Middle East objectives by collaborating
with individual states, which it deems capable of steering the affairs of the region to its favor.
Most notably, Saudi Arabia, and its ally Israel, these states in turn act as “regional overseers.”
This foreign policy approach began to take shape after the Riyadh summit with about fifty
predominantly Muslim nations.
President Donald Trump addressed the summit, and spoke on diverse issues, with
terrorism, and the menace of Iran being the crux of his speech. The president, taking a hardline
against terrorism, stated that all present stakeholders should “drive out” terrorists and extremists,
and that “this summit will mark the beginning of the end for those who practice terror and spread
its vile creed.”210 The president's language was also very tough on Iran, insisting that the Iranian
government gives terrorists “safe harbor, financial backing, and the social standing needed for
recruitment,” and further stated that “all nations of conscience must work together to isolate
Iran.” 211
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The content and language of the Riyadh speech sing harmoniously in tune with past
presidents of the United States, as regards U.S. Middle East policy. For example, former
President George Bush, described terrorism as America's greatest threat, and Iran as a part of the
axis of evil. However, the strategic environment created by President Donald Trump's America's
First policies changed the geopolitical dynamics of the region in a very distinct way.
As noted by the European Council of Foreign Relations, the actions carried out by the
Saud-led bloc against Qatar were made possible due to President Trump‟s “permission to do
so.”212 Saudi Arabia and its allies were able to convince the U.S. president that Qatar was a
perennial supporter of terrorism, and its relationship with Iran is a source of instability in the
region.213 These accusations struck the heart of the president's “America's first” policy, due to his
administration's hardline stance on terrorism and Iran. A welcome development for Saudi Arabia,
given the ambivalent attitude that the past Obama administration had towards Saudi Arabia,
denying the Kingdom the free hand to act as it pleased while striking a conciliatory tone with
Iran.214
The president seemed to believe that constraints such as agreements and political
relationships have limited the ability of the United States to act decisively, in accordance with
U.S. interest. In this light, irrespective of the fact that Qatar is a strategic ally of the United
States, and both countries share a symbolic political relationship, Saudi Arabia and its allies were
still able to persuade President Trump to support a hardline stance against Qatar. With this
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assurance came a barrage of attacks by Saudi Arabia and its allies against Qatar, aimed at
isolating the small country.
In a dramatic twist from the norm as experienced by previous U.S. administrations, which
had chosen to deal with the “Qatar problem” diplomatically, President Trump openly sided with
the Saudis. In a joint press conference with President Iohannis of Romania, President Trump
stated that “the nation of Qatar, unfortunately, has historically been a funder of terrorism at a
very high level, and in the wake of that conference, nations came together and spoke to me about
confronting Qatar over its behavior.”215 In a series of social media statements, the president
seemed to imply that Qatar was the only actor that needed to be reprimanded for supporting
terrorism. The president‟s position further strengthened the Saudi Bloc to take unprecedented
actions against Qatar, which in the end, could prove too costly as explained below.

Implications of U.S. Foreign Policy Position in the Gulf Cooperation Crisis
The United States under the administration of President Trump, seemed to have
approached the Middle East, and all the problems associated with it, from a black and white
perspective. This comes with inherent difficulties, as the Middle East is a region saturated with
many intricate challenges that create complex phenomena and gray areas for observers, scholars,
and policymakers. Thus, a policy approach towards the Middle East should also reflect its
idiosyncrasies and peculiarities.
The failures of American interventions in Iraq, Libya, and Afghanistan are proofs of the
complexities associated with the Middle East. These interventions failed because past U.S.
administrations failed to take into account the geopolitical intricacies associated with the Middle
215
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East. In this light, a black and white approach to solving the G.C.C crisis could fail because, the
GCC crisis is a complex issue arising from the geopolitical, historical, and social interactions of
the Gulf states.216
By appearing to have picked sides against Qatar through a string of tweets, the U.S.
president might have certain facts associated with other GCC states. Qatar rightfully should be
called out, as a prime sponsor of terrorism in the region, However, GCC states, such as Saudi
Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Kuwait are not absolved from the same offenses levied
against Qatar.217 Saudi Arabia is reported to be the second-largest source of fighters for ISIS.218
Moreover, it is a known fact that Saudi Arabia‟s wahhabism doctrine is an ideological staple for
terrorist organizations worldwide.219 The UAE and Kuwait have also been reported to be
complicit in their obligations to combat terrorism.
The root cause of the GCC crisis is thus more than Qatar‟s support for terrorism. The
similar roots and familial ties, which the Gulf States share, should be brought into consideration,
which means big political issues could also be family like disputes.220 In this light, Saudi Arabia
has always viewed itself as the natural leader of the GCC family and has wielded its ideological
and geopolitical influence among the GCC States.221 However, as noted above, Qatar has chosen
to pursue its independent policy, which appears to be the core of the GCC crisis. In this light, it
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could be self-defeating if the United States tries to achieve its Middle East objectives by overly
trusting the foreign policy, goals, objectives, and intentions of one state in the region over
another.
This political scenario is filled with a number of strategic problems for the United States.
Saudi Arabia, which seems to have emerged as the pivot of America's strategy in the Middle
East, might be using the legitimacy and endorsements of President Trump to pursue individual
geopolitical gains as opposed to addressing specific U.S. concerns about Qatar.222 This is very
plausible, especially after reports that Saudi Arabia and the UAE tried to carry out military
intervention in Qatar.
The unprecedented nature and escalation of the GCC crisis is a clear indication that Saudi
Arabia and its allies took Presidents Trump‟s statements at the Riyadh summit as a blank check
to do as they please.223 This could have profound geopolitical consequences for the Middle East
and the U.S. desire for stability, and cooperation among allies in the region. This is due to the
fact, that Saudi Arabia, which is the principal political driver behind the recent move of the GCC
to isolate Qatar is governed de facto by the young, and inexperienced crowned prince of Saudi
Arabia, Mohammad bin Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, also known as MBS. Prince MBS gained
prominence after he was made the minister of defense in 2015, and was appointed crown prince
in 2017 by his father, King Salman bin Abdulaziz.224
His policies as defense minister have seen Saudi Arabia become a more active actor in
the region, from the civil war in Yemen to its lead role in the GCC's isolation of Qatar. This
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young prince has a penchant for direct and confrontational policies, which often prove to be
strategic quagmires in the long run. In his bid to curb the influence of Iran in Yemen, he entered
into an unending war with the Houthi rebels, whose backing by Iran was grossly overstated. In
fact, he gained just the opposite, as Iran ratcheted up its support for the Houthi's in response to
Saudi led intervention, which has turned the Yemeni conflict to what the United Nations has
described as a “man-made human catastrophe.”225 His blockade on Yemen is a testament to his
political brashness, which according to reports is gradually leading Yemen to the brink of one of
the worst famines in history.226
In this light, having the implicit endorsement of the president of the United States to carry
out his unguided policies usually laced with paranoia, will most likely put the region in deep
geopolitical pandemonium. In fact, according to media reports, after instigating the blockade
against Qatar, Prince Salman was allegedly planning to take military actions against Qatar.227 A
move, if followed, would have devastated the tenuous political structures, which the U.S. has
tried to build over the years to maintain its interest in the region.
As the GCC crisis lingers, one of the greatest implications for the United States is the
high probability of Qatar aligning with Turkey and Iran. This is very plausible, given the scale of
isolation, that Qatar has being made to face, with the various states imposing blockades which
can amount to a declaration of war. The blockades are particularly harmful to Qatar's economy
and political survival as a whole, given the fact, that Qatar imports over ninety-nine percent of its
225
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foodstuff from outside, being a small state with a landmass made up of mostly deserts unsuitable
for agriculture.228
With Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Egypt imposing land, sea, and
airspace blockades on Qatar, Iran, and Turkey have been very keen on exploiting this rift for
their strategic benefits. Iran has started exporting foodstuff to Qatar, with an Iranian diplomat
stating that “dozens of Iranian businesses are ready to help Qatar with more goods if they are
needed.”229 This economic relationship can further strengthen the economic position of Iran in
the region, given the fact, that many of the goods Qatar imports from its blockading neighbors
are also produced commercially by Iran.230 This economic relationship can further strengthen the
financial backbone of Iran, giving more momentum to its destabilizing regional adventures,
which the United States and its allies in the region are very keen on curbing. To further cement
its alliance with Iran, Qatar has restored full diplomatic ties with Iran, as a hint to its new
geopolitical trajectory.231
As Qatar seeks to ease the diplomatic, economic, and security pressures placed on it as a
result of the GCC crisis, Qatar also has been increasingly moving closer to Turkey. On paper,
Qatar's alliance with Turkey should not ring a geopolitical alarm for the United States, since it is
a NATO ally. However, in light of Turkey's radical transformation, both internally and in its
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foreign policy, there are ample reasons why Washington should be alert to this strategic
development.
Turkey's political direction runs adversely to that of the United States, with its increasing
adventurist foreign policy that directly challenges American interests.232 Turkey has made it a
core foreign policy objective to support the Muslim Brotherhood across the region, which has
drawn the ire of U.S. allies such as Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia.233 Along
with supporting the Brotherhood, Turkey is also a major political supporter of Hamas and seems
to have an Islamist political agenda for the region.234
Turkey‟s recent purchase of advanced missile defense systems from Russia, despite U.S.
concerns, is a pointer to the deteriorating state of U.S.-Turkish relations. As noted by Steve
Cook, senior fellow for Middle East and Africa studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, “the
United States and Turkey have gone from ambivalent allies to antagonists.”235
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RECOMMENDATIONS FOR USA’S FOREIGN POLICY APPROACH TOWARDS
QATAR

The United States Can Discourage Qatar from Being Complicit in its Counter Terrorism
Efforts by Strategically Employing Different Instruments of States Power
Qatar is a partner with the United States, and other relevant stakeholders in the fight
against terrorism and extremism. For instance, Qatar is a full partner and active participant in the
Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, and has enacted legislation to address terrorism, terrorist
financing, and related offenses, which complements other criminal laws.236 Qatar has also funded
efforts by the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Center (UNCCT) to help address key
challenges to international peace and security.237
In this light, the United States can increase its pressure on Qatari officials diplomatically
and politically to ensure Qatar complies with its obligations. Past actions by the Qatari
government have proved the efficacy of U.S. pressure. For Example, Qatar has frozen funds and
enacted travel bans against UN-designated financiers per its obligations as a member state, and
prosecuted individuals involved in terror financing after significant U.S. pressure.238
The U.S. can exert further pressure on Qatar by bringing Qatar‟s violations of
international laws to combat terrorism to the United Nations Security Council. For example,
Qatar‟s failures to combat terrorism financing, or prosecute individuals for supporting terrorist
activities within its territories constitute violations of numerous UN resolutions, such as UN
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resolution 2462. The Resolution calls for all states to prevent and suppress the financing of
terrorist acts, and to refrain from providing support to those involved in them.239
The United States can also apply pressure on Doha to arrest or expel wanted and
internationally designated individuals inside its borders, including members of the Hamas and
Taliban delegations currently domiciled inside Qatar.240 The U.S. can do this, by enforcing the
Export Administration Act of 1979, which calls for strict licensing requirements for trade in dualuse items to countries that knowingly grant safe haven to operatives of terrorist groups.241

The USA Can Increase Pressure on Qatar by Seeking an Alternative Location for its
Military Bases
As stated above, U.S. military bases in Qatar play a very important role in the fight
against terrorism in the region, especially in places like Syria and Iraq, where the U.S. has been
conducting regular airstrikes to decimate the Islamic State, and other terrorist groups. Qatar sees
U.S. military bases located on its soil as an extension of U.S. security Umbrella and relies
extensively on U.S. military bases in its territory for its security.
However, the United States can make it clear that its presence in Qatar does not give
Qatar the moral right or legitimacy to carry out policies that are prejudicial to U.S. interest in the
region or its allies. The United States could in this regard, explore the possibility of relocating its
base to other countries in the region, which have shown more willingness to align with the
239
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interest of the United States.242 As stated by President Donald Trump in an interview with the
Christian Broadcasting Network (CBN), many countries are willing to pay to host the U.S.
airbases.243
In this light, The United States can leverage the presence of its airbase and service
members in Qatar, to secure greater commitments and guarantees from Qatar‟s government, not
to engage in activities that destabilize the region or its neighbor's.244 This commitment can
include an agreement from Qatar to tone down its inciting news broadcast on Al Jazeera on U.S.
Gulf allies. This should not be seen as a way of ending Qatar's initiative at encouraging free
speech or freedom of the press however, the U.S. should bring to the fore, the use of certain
deliberate and harmful narratives by Al Jazeera, to embarrass the Gulf monarchies. The U.S.
should also make it known, that Al Jazeera‟s Arabic damaging coverage of the U.S., which incite
hatred against the U.S. will not be tolerated as an ally with similar objectives in the region.

The United States Could Diplomatically Engage the GCC to Strengthen Relations between
Member States in Other to Settle Inter-State Rivalry
The United States has been an influential actor in the Middle East, since the abdication of
the British Empire in the 1970s, and has become unrivaled by the demise of the United Soviets
Socialist Republics (USSR). These turn of events has left the United States in a very
advantageous geopolitical position, as a strategic actor in the Middle East. In this light, the U.S.
has the needed influence and geopolitical standing, particularly with the members of the GCC.
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Since the GCC remains one of the most important blocs of allies in the Gulf, both
economically and in security, the United States should diplomatically engage the member states
to align with the U.S. in areas of strategic and shared interests.245 This will in turn, require Qatar
to follow courses of actions and joint plans, backed by the U.S. For instance, the U.S. can bring
Qatar onboard U.S. backed plans to slow down and prevent terrorists financing in the region.
For the U.S. to be successful in the use of diplomacy, as a tool in getting the GCC
members on the same page on diverse issues, the United States should address terrorism as a
wider problem facing the GCC. Choosing to single out Qatar as without criticism of other GCC
countries is an error of omission that does little to advance a workable solution to the crisis.246
The blockading states as noted above, have engaged in the same destabilizing vices as Qatar. In
this light, the United States could be more sensitive and aware of the political dynamics at play
in the GCC to make better diplomatic policies. By carrying out diplomacy in this manner, the
efforts of the United States would be viewed as credible, which is a quality desired in a
diplomatic process.

The United States Should Encourage Qatar to Return to its Prior Role as a Mediator of
Conflicts in the Region
Qatar has tested both waters of mediation and regional adventurism, and it is strikingly
obvious that Qatar's best years as an international actor on the global stage, have been in times it
sought to mediate between conflicting parties and not take sides in the conflict. Qatar's mediating
activities have come with varied results; however, the efforts are always worthwhile.
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In this light, the United States can encourage Qatar to be more active as a mediator in
times of crisis, which hitherto Qatar had been known for. Although Qatar may have lost some of
its credibility as an impartial mediator, Qatar still maintains the numerous contacts of individual
and group actors, which are parties to various conflicts. Such contacts have benefited the United
States at various times. For example, Qatar helped broker a ceasefire between Hamas and Israel
during periods of intense fighting, and also helped secure the release of Peter Theo Curtis, an
American hostage held for nearly two years by the Al Qaeda linked Al-Nusra Front in Syria. 247
In this regard, Qatar's relationship with Iran, which has been a source of tension between
Qatar and U.S. allies in the Middle East is somewhat overstated, and has only gained momentum
as Qatar seeks new allies. The United States should seek to prevent Saudi Arabia and its allies
from pushing Qatar too far, due to its relationship with Iran, which is largely based on economic
interest. However, Qatar‟s relationship with Iran can instead be viewed as a political card, which
the U.S. can utilize in times of need for a diplomatic window needed to engage Iran on a range of
geopolitical issues. In this light, forcing Qatar to take the same hardline stance as Saudi Arabia
may be counterproductive, since Qatar‟s relationship with Iran can prove strategically valuable in
the long run.
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CONCLUSION

The maverick and often confusing policies of Qatar continue to beg the question among
U.S. policymakers, and that is, “is Qatar a reliable ally?” or is “Qatar a friend or foe of the
United States?” In response to the confusing stance on Qatar, former U.S. Secretary of State John
Kerry, in his position as a senator in 2009, expressed his frustration, stating that “Qatar can‟t
continue to be an American ally on Monday that sends money to Hamas on Tuesday.”248
It is pertinent the United States take a tougher and more decisive stance on Qatar, in light
of the important role the decisions and actions of the United States plays on the world stage. The
United States as a democracy, and a frontline actor against terrorism, has a moral obligation to
respond to acts that undermine international law and order. Qatar‟s activities as a permissive
jurisdiction for terrorism, and terrorism financing should not be condoned by the United States.
However, the path to a more predictable Qatar seems to be clearer in sight, in light of its
current diplomatic and political travails as a result of the GCC crisis. The United States should
channel the political momentum created by the GCC crisis, to push Qatar to a more harmonious
stance on geopolitical issues that align with U.S. interests in the region. This should be done by
taking active measures against Qatar to curb its excesses. These measures should be consistent
and stringent enough to alter the calculus of Qatar, which should include sanctions, and policies
that can further isolate Qatar. The United States should also be consistent in ensuring that it
holds all its Middle Eastern allies to the same standard as Qatar. The United States can also make
it clear that Qatar‟s security begins at home with the peaceful coexistence with its allies, and not
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abroad in trying to go against the interest of its neighbors, which are also allies of the United
States.
However, it is important that the United State recognize the benefits of Qatar in the long
run, as Qatar has made various contributions that have helped the United States in achieving
some of its objectives, especially, in the areas of counter-terrorism. Nevertheless, a passive
response from the United States is not in the interest of the U.S., since Qatar‟s actions undercut
core values of the United States. In today‟s globalized world, the United States or its allies might
be vulnerable to attacks that can result from Qatar‟s consistent failure to live up to its
international and regional responsibilities. In this light, the United States should be firm in its
dealings with Qatar, which means that the United States should not hesitate in applying various
forms of pressure in response to Qatar‟s policies that pose threats to its interest.
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